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Investor-State Disputes Under
NAFTA: A Tale of Fear and
Equilibrium
Charles H. Brower, 11*
Writers initially regarded the North American Free Trade Agreement's
investment chapter (Chapter 11)' as an "overwhelmingly positive"2 regime
that would protect Canadian and United States investors from arbitrary
treatment at the hands of Mexican authorities.' Despite some early
warnings,4 few considered the possibility that Chapter 11 might also provide
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provided by Dean Samuel M. Davis, the Lamar Order, and the Pittman-Scruggs-Nutt research-
related travel endowment at the University of Mississippi School of Law. The author prepared this
article for a conference in January 2001. The article does not address developments that occurred
between the time of submission and publication. For a discussion of more recent events, see Charles
H. Brower, II, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back, 40 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. _ (forthcoming 2001).
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., ch. 11, 32 1.L.M.
605, 639-49 [hereinafter NAFTA].
2. Richard C. Levin & Susan Erickson Main, NAFTA Chapter 11: Investment and Investment
Disputes, 2 NAFTA L. & Bus. REV. AM. 82, 115 (1996).
3. See HOWARD MANN & KONRAD VON MOLTKE, NAFTA'S CHAPTER 11 AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: ADDRESSING THE IMPACTS OF THE INVESTOR-STATE PROCESS ON THE ENVIRONMENT 12
(1999), available at http://www.iisd.org/trade/Chapter I 1.htm; Tim Kennish, NAFTA and Investment
- A Canadian Perspective, in NAFTA AND INVESTMENT 1, 7 (Seymour J. Rubin & Dean C.
Alexander eds., 1995); Levin & Marin, supra note 2, at 83; Howard Mann, NAFTA and the
Environment: Lessons for the Future, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 387, 402 (2000); Julie A. Soloway,
Environmental Trade Barriers Under NAFTA: The MMT Fuel Additives Controversy, 8 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 55, 88 (1999) [hereinafter Soloway, Environmental Trade Barriers under NAFTA];
Julie A. Soloway, NAFTA's Chapter 11: The Challenge of Private Party Participation, 16 J. INT'L
ARB. 1, 4 (1999) [hereinafter Soloway, The Challenge of Private Party Participation]; Samrat
Ganguly, Note, The Investor-State Dispute Mechanism (ISDM) and a Sovereign's Power to Protect
Public Health, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 113, 154 (1999); Tali Levy, Note, NAFTA's Provision
for Compensation in the Event of Expropriation: A Reassessment of the "Prompt, Adequate and
Effective" Standard, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 423, 444 (1995); Daniel R. Loritz, Comment, Corporate
Predators Attack Environmental Regulations: It's Time to Arbitrate Claims Filed Under NAFTA's
Chapter 11, 22 LOy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 533, 535 (2000); Stephen L. Kass, Regulatory
Takings Reopened: Surprising, Potentially Significant, Context Is NAFTA Chapter 11, N.Y.L.J.,
Sept. 11, 2000, § 2, col. 1.
4. See Richard G. Dearden, Arbitration of Expropriation Disputes Between an Investor and the
State Under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 29 J. WORLD TRADE 113, 114, 126-27
an instrument for vigorous scrutiny of measures adopted or maintained by
Canadian and U.S. authorities.5 Following the initiation of several claims
against their governments, however, Canadian and U.S. writers have
denounced the purportedly "aggressive"6 use of investor-state arbitration as
an "offensive" weapon7 that has ."chilled"' the exercise of regulatory
authority and caused an "alarming" loss of sovereignty.9 Based on the wide
variety of pending claims, writers warn that. Chapter 11 provides foreign
corporations with a reliable "tool for attacking any legislation or regulation
that they do not find beneficial to their investment[s]."' To combat this
apparent threat, some writers advocate a retreat from liberal access to
investor-state arbitration."
(Feb. 1995) (predicting the regular use of Chapter 11 in disputes alleging expropriation and
explaining that Chapter 11 fetters the discretion of NAFTA Parties).
5. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 3, at 4; Lawrence L. Herman, Settlement of
International Trade Disputes - Challenges to Sovereignty - A Canadian Perspective, 24 CAN.-U.S.
L.J. 121, 133-34 (1998); Soloway, The Challenge of Private Party Participation, supra note 3, at 4;
Soloway, Environmental Trade Barriers Under NAFTA, supra note 3, at 88; Julia Ferguson, Note,
California's MTBE Contaminated Water: An Illustration of the Need for an Environmental
Interpretive Note on Article 1110 of NAFTA, 11 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL L. & POL'Y 499, 503 (2000).
6. MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 3, at 4; Mann, supra note 3, at 405-06. See also J. Martin
Wagner, International Investment, Expropriation and Environmental Protection, 29 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 465,466 (1999); Loritz, supra note 3, at 534.
7. MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 3, at 5; Mann, supra note 3, at 405; Ferguson, supra note
5, at 503; Ganguly, supra note 3, at 153.
8. See S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award, at para. 203 (Nov. 13, 2000) (separate
opinion of Bryan Schwartz) (NAFTA/UNCITRAL), available at http://www.appletonlaw.coml
4b2myers.htm; Mann, supra note 3, at 406; Justin Byrne, Note, NAFTA Dispute Resolution:
Implementing True Rule-Based Diplomacy Through Direct Access, 35 TEx. INT'L L.J. 415, 432
(2000); Ferguson, supra note 5, at 500; Ganguly, supra note 3, at 119; Loritz, supra note 3, at 546.
See also Dr. Rainer Geiger, Towards a Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 31 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 467, 471 (1998) (observing that "[e]nvironmental organizations are concerned about a chilling
effect on governmental protection of the environment, resulting from investor claims that
environmental regulation amounts to expropriation").
9. Ganguly, supra note 3, at 126. See also S.D. Myers, Partial Award, at paras. 12, 86 (Nov. 13,
2000) (separate opinion of Bryan Schwartz); Kevin Banks, NAFTA's Article 1110-Can Regulation
Be Expropriation?, 5 NAFTA L. & Bus. REV. AM. 499, 499 (1999); Herman, supra note 5, at 123,
134; Pierre Sauve, Canada, Free Trade, and the Diminishing Returns of Hemispheric Regionalism, 4
UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 237, 244 (1999-2000); Soloway, Environmental Trade Barriers
Under NAFTA, supra note 3, at 88; Byrne, supra note 8, at 430; Loritz, supra note 3, at 546-47.
10. Ganguly, supra note 3, at 152. See also Banks, supra note 9, at 504; Herman, supra note 5,
at 134; Soloway, Environmental Trade Barriers Under NAFTA, supra note 3, at 88-89; Ferguson,
supra note 5, at 515.
11. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 3, at 58; Herman, supra note 5, at 135-37; Wagner,
supra note 6, at 467-68; Ferguson, supra note 5, at 518-19; Ganguly, supra note 3, at 166.
[Vol. 29: 43, 2001] Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Joined in part by the Canadian and U.S. governments,' 2 writers also
support the adoption of binding interpretive statements to limit the
substantive obligations of Chapter 11.' Such proposals express little
confidence in arbitrators to render decisions that could mitigate popular
concern.1
4
Over the past year, however, Chapter 11 tribunals have issued a number
of decisions and awards that provide an important opportunity for
reassessment of the criticisms that have been leveled at Chapter 11. Part I
lays the foundation for such an analysis by reviewing the structure and
purpose of Chapter 11. To explain why Chapter 11 has caused an
outpouring of public concern, Part II describes the surprising variety of
claims submitted to arbitration under its authority. Part III examines recent
decisions of Chapter 11 tribunals to determine whether the emerging trends
support the criticisms of Chapter 11. In so doing, Part III identifies a
balanced interpretive strategy employed by most Chapter 11 tribunals.
When construing Chapter Il 's provisions on procedure and jurisdiction,
most tribunals have adopted flexible interpretations that promote access to
arbitration and a hearing on the merits. When construing the substantive
obligations of Chapter 11, however, tribunals have hewed more closely to
the treaty's text and specific rules of international law. This suggests that
expansive claims will frequently survive procedural and jurisdictional
objections, but are much less likely to pass through the more rigorous filter
of substantive disciplines. Thus, condemnation of Chapter 11 may be
premature; Chapter 11 provides broad opportunities to challenge measures
adopted or maintained by host states, but the substantive disciplines offer
adequate protection against abusive claims.
12. See S.D. Myers, Partial Award, at para. 205 (Nov. 13, 2000) (separate opinion of Bryan
Schwartz); MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 3, at 10-11, 47-48; Mann, supra note 3, at 406;
Sabrina Safrin et al., International Legal Developments in Review: 1999: Public International
Law/Environmental Law, 34 INT'L LAW. 707, 725 n.56 (2000); Soloway, The Challenge of Private
Party Participation, supra note 3, at 13; Ferguson, supra note 5, at 516; Loritz, supra note 3, at 547
n. 105.
13. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 3, at 7-8, 20-21, 37, 47-48; Herman, supra note 5, at
136; Soloway, The Challenge of Private Party Participation, supra note 3, at 14; Ferguson, supra
note 5, at 517-18. In July 2001, the Free Trade Commission (i.e., cabinet-level representatives of the
NAFTA Parties) adopted the first Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter II Provisions. See infra
note 249.
14. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 3, at 17 ("[T]he legal uncertainties in the Chapter 11
disciplines are... unlikely to be significantly reduced by pending arbitrations.").
I. STRUCTURE AND PURPOSE OF CHAPTER 11
Structurally, Chapter 11 resembles bilateral investment treaties (BITs),'5
which create standards for treatment of investors and establish procedures
for resolving investor-state disputes. For example, Section A of Chapter 11
imposes the following key disciplines. First, Section A permits
expropriation and measures tantamount to expropriation only for a public
purpose, on a nondiscriminatory basis, in accordance with due process of
law and the minimum standard of treatment under Chapter 11, and upon
prompt payment of fair market value (plus interest) in freely-transferable
funds. 6 Second, Section A prohibits certain performance requirements,
including requirements to export a given level or percentage of goods or
services, or to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content.'7
Third, Section A requires NAFTA Parties to treat each other's investors in
accordance with the relative standards of national treatment and most-
favored-nation (MFN) treatment." Fourth, Section A establishes a minimum
standard, which requires NAFTA Parties to treat each other's investors in
accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment 9
Section B of Chapter 11 secures these obligations by providing for
investor-state arbitration of claims alleging that a NAFTA Party (or one of
its state enterprises or monopolies) has violated one of the provisions found
in Section A."' Under Section B, NAFTA investors may demand arbitration
under the ICSID Convention (if the investor's home state and the disputing
NAFTA Party are both states parties to that convention), the Additional
Facility Rules of ICSID (if either the investor's home state or the disputing
NAFTA Party is a state party to the ICSID Convention), or the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules.2'
15. See S.D. Myers, Partial Award, at paras. 58, 77 (Nov. 13, 2000) (separate opinion of Bryan
Schwartz); Michael P. Avramovich, The Protection of International Investment at the Start of the
Twenty-First Century: Will Anachronistic Notions of Business Render Irrelevant the OECD's
Multilateral Agreement on Investment?, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1201, 1240-41 (1998); Charles N.
Brower & Lee A. Steven, Who Then Should Judge?: Developing the International Rule of Law
Under NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 193, 193-194 (2001); David A. Gantz, Resolution of
Investment Disputes Under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 10 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 335, 339 (1993); Herman, supra note 5, at 133; Soloway, The Challenge of Private Party
Participation, supra note 3, at 4; David R. Adair, Comment, Investors' Rights: The Evolutionary
Process of Investment Treaties, 6 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 195, 204 (1999); Christopher N.
Camponovo, Comment, Dispute Settlement and the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 1
UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 181, 195 (1996); Ferguson, supra note 5, at 502; Ganguly, supra
note 3, at 132-33; Levy, supra note 3, at 445, 446-47.
16. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 11 10(1)-(6), 32 I.L.M. at 641-42.
17. Id. at arts. 1106(1)(a), (b), 1106(3)(b), 32 I.L.M. at 640.
18. Id. at arts. 1102, 1103, 32 I.L.M. at 639.
19. Id. at art. 1105(1), 32 I.L.M. at 639.
20. Id. at art. 1116(1), 32 I.L.M. at 642-43.
21. Id. at art. 1120(1), 32 I.L.M. at 643. Presently, the United States is a state party to the ICSID
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Thus, Chapter 11 reiterates traditional principles of international
investment law that favor investor security." Their incorporation into
NAFTA represented an apparent victory for U.S. negotiators, who wanted to
liberalize the Mexican investment regime, 3 protect U.S. investors from
expropriation,24 and remove investor-state disputes from the Mexican
judicial process, which was "generally considered corrupt or at least
compliant with the will of the state."'  Negotiators also expected this
mechanism to relieve the U.S. government from intervening in, and thus
politicizing, investment disputes between U.S. companies and the Mexican
state.26
II. PUBLIC CONCERN ABOUT RECENT CLAIMS
While Chapter 11 builds on the familiar structure of BITs, it "places the
regime in a novel context."27  For the first time, the substantive and
procedural obligations appear in an investment treaty whose adherents
include two developed states, Canada and the United States. "Thus,
NAFTA investors can now hold Canada and the United States to the
demands traditionally placed on developing states." 9  Inevitably, this
Convention, but Canada and Mexico are not. See Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Decision Regarding the
Place of Arbitration (Nov. 28, 1997) (NAFrA/UNCITRAL), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 702, 703 n.5
(1999).
22. See International Law in Ferment: Recent Developments in Private International Law, 94
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 11, 13 (2000) (remarks of Charles H. Brower, II) [hereinafter Brower
Remarks]. See also Herman, supra note 5, at 133-34 (describing Chapter 11 as an apparently
"straightforward application of acceptable international standards of treatment"); Gloria L. Sandrino,
The NAFTA Investment Chapter and Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico: A Third World
Perspective, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 259, 326 (1994) (observing that the NAFTA's "investment
provisions reaffirm[]... traditional rules governing foreign property"); Ferguson, supra note 5, at
502 ("[U]S negotiators aimed to secure treaty language that adequately reflected US interpretations
of the international law of expropriations.").
23. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 3, at 11; Daniel M. Price, An Overview of the NAFTA
Investment Chapter: Substantive Rules and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 27 INT'L LAW. 727,
727 (1993); Levin & Marin, supra note 2, at 83; Ganguly, supra note 3, at 133.
24. See Ferguson, supra note 5, at 503; Ganguly, supra note 3, at 154; Loritz, supra note 3, at
533, 535; Kass, supra note 3, § 2, col. 1.
25. Mann, supra note 3, at 402. See also Soloway, Environmental Trade Barriers Under
NAFTA, supra note 3, at 88; Kass, supra note 3, § 2, col. 1.
26. See Brower & Steven, supra note 15, at 195.
27. Brower Remarks, supra note 22, at 14. See also Brower & Steven, supra note 15, at 194-
195.
28. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 3, at 4; Brower & Steven, supra note 15, at 195;
Price, supra note 23, at 731; Towards an Effective International Investment Regime, 91 AM. SOC'Y
INT'L L. PROc. 485, 492 (1997) (remarks of Daniel M. Price); Safrin et al., supra note 12, at 723.
29. Brower Remarks, supra note 22, at 14. See also Price, supra note 23, at 736.
encourages claimants to use the investor-security bias of international law as
a platform from which to challenge venerable policies and institutions."°
In 1998, two events highlighted the significance of Chapter 11 as an
"untapped source of ... investor rights."3' First, Canada withdrew a ban on
the importation of (and inter-provincial trade in) the fuel additive MMT
rather than defend itself against the $251 million claim of Virginia-based
Ethyl Corporation.32 Second, a Canadian investor brought a $725 million
claim against the United States based on Mississippi state court proceedings,
in which (a) race and nationality may have contributed to a $500 million
damage award, and (b) the state's 125% appellate bonding requirement
foreclosed an appeal.3 These cases quickly established Chapter 11 as the
foundation for a surprising range of claims.
The ensuing two years witnessed the initiation of at least five new
claims, four of which were directed at Canada or the United States.34 Taking
the claims in chronological order, a United States company, Pope & Talbot,
Inc., brought its $125 million claim against Canada in March 1999." Pope
30. See Brower Remarks, supra note 22, at 14.
31. Gary N. Horlick & Alicia L. Marti, NAFTA Chapter liB: A Private Right of Action to
Enforce Market Access Through Investments, 14 J. INT'L ARB. 43, 54 (1997).
32. See Christopher Dugan & John Nalbandian, Introductory Note to NAFTA Chapter 11
Arbitral Tribunal: Ethyl Corporation v. The Government of Canada (Decision Regarding the Place
of Arbitration), 38 I.L.M. 700, 702 (1999) (observing that, following an adverse award on
jurisdiction, Canada settled Ethyl Corp.'s claim by agreeing to withdraw the ban on MMT and to pay
$13 million in compensation).
33. See Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Notice of Claim, at 2-3 (on file with the Pepperdine
Law Review).
34. Because many of the submissions in Chapter 11 proceedings are confidential, writers
frequently cannot obtain sufficient information about the existence and nature of pending disputes.
See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 3, at 7; Banks, supra note 9, at 501; Chi Carmody, Beyond
the Proposals: Public Participation in International Economic Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1321,
1342-43 & n.67 (2000); Safrin et al., supra note 12, at 725 n.54; Wagner, supra note 6, at 487;
Ferguson, supra note 5, at 506, 513; Kass, supra note 3, § 2, col. 1.
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) should provide access to relevant documents within
the possession, custody, or control of the Department of Justice (which is handling Loewen Group
Inc. v. United States) and the State Department (which is handling all other Chapter 11 claims). In
response to the author's FOIA request of October 5, 2000, the Department of Justice provided
documents on the Loewen case and waived copying and search fees. The State Department's
regulations indicate that it "shall" waive or reduce search and copying fees, provided that
"[d]isclosure of the information is in the public interest.., and is not primarily in the commercial
interest of the requester." 22 C.F.R. § 171.15. Surprisingly, the State Department initially denied
the author's October 5, 2000 request for a fee waiver on the grounds that disclosure would not serve
the public interest. Following an administrative appeal, the State Department agreed in principle to
some fee reduction during the summer of 2001. As of this writing, the author and the State
Department have not agreed on the amount or nature of the fee reduction. Therefore, the author has
not received any responsive documents from the State Department.
Under the circumstances, the author has endeavored to provide accurate information, but
recognizes that it may not be complete. Because readers may have difficulty in obtaining primary
documents, the author discusses the underlying facts of claims and the reasoning adopted by
tribunals to a greater extent than he otherwise would.
35. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Statement of Claim Under the Arbitration Rules of the United
[Vol. 29: 43, 2001] Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
& Talbot challenged Canadian regulations that implemented the 1996
Softwood Lumber Agreement by requiring producers in four Canadian
provinces to obtain permits for - and pay fees on - certain lumber exports to
the United States.36 According to Pope & Talbot, Canada's administration of
these measures denied its Canadian subsidiary national treatment, and fair
and equitable treatment;" constituted a performance requirement;38 and
represented a measure tantamount to expropriation." As explained below,
the tribunal has rendered a series of partial awards on jurisdiction and the
merits.'°
In April 1999, a United States citizen initiated a $50 million claim
against Mexico for the tax treatment of his Mexican company, Corporacion
de Exportaciones Mexicanas, S.A. (CEMSA). The claim alleged that
Mexican tax authorities arbitrarily (and in violation of court orders) denied
CEMSA excise tax rebates." The investor described these measures as an
expropriation and the denial of justice.42 Of the five new claims, only this
one fits the paradigm of investor-state disputes that U.S. negotiators
contemplated when drafting Chapter 11.
In July 1999, a Canadian company, Methanex Corporation, served its
Notice of Intent to file a $970 million claim against the United States. ' 3
Methanex asserted that California's ban of the fuel additive MTBE
constitutes a measure tantamount to expropriation and a denial of "fair and
equitable" treatment," inasmuch as California did not rely on scientific
evidence, failed to consider alternative regulations, and adopted measures
Nations Commission on International Trade Law and the North American Free Trade Agreement, at
29, available at http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b3P&T.htm [hereinafter Pope & Talbot, Statement of
Claim].
36. Id. at 5-7.
37. Id. at 20-22. Pope & Talbot initially asserted that the measures also violated the principle of
MFN treatment, but later withdrew that part of its claim. Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Interim Award
at para. 14 (June 26, 2000) (NAFTA/UNCITRAL), available at http://www.appletonlaw.coml
4b3P&T.htm.
38. Pope & Talbot, Statement of Claim, supra note 35, at 22-23.
39. Id. at 23-27.
40. See infra notes 78-84, 87-92, 119-32, 163-65, 167-68, 179, 188-90, 194-98, 237, 245, 249
and accompanying text.
41. See Feldman v. Mexico, Notice of Arbitration, at 5-6 (on file with the Pepperdine Law
Review).
42. See id. at 8-11.
43. Methanex Corp. v. United States, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under
Article 1119, Section B, Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement, available at
http://www.methanex.com/investorcentre/MTBE.htm.
44. Id. at 2-4.
not reasonably necessary to protect legitimate public interests. 5 "By casting
its argument in these terms, Methanex implies that 'fair and equitable
treatment' incorporates the types of restrictions that Article XX(b) of the
General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) places on health, safety,
and environmental laws."46
In September 1999, a Canadian company, Mondev International, Ltd.,
filed its Notice of Arbitration in a $50 million claim against the United
States. While it lacked the colorful facts of the Mississippi court
proceedings in Loewen, this claim also involved state court proceedings. 7
Mondev claimed that a combination of actions taken by Boston city
authorities, the state trial court, and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court resulted in a denial of justice, a measure tantamount to expropriation,
and a denial of fair and equitable treatment.'" Mondev asserted that the
Supreme Judicial Court contributed to these NAFTA violations by
reweighing jury findings, ignoring its own standard of review, adopting a
novel legal theory that the parties never asserted, and applying it
retroactively to reverse a multi-million dollar jury award.'9
Finally, in January 2000, United Parcel Service of America, Inc. (UPS)
served its Notice of Intent to pursue a $100 million claim against Canada."
UPS claimed that Canada unlawfully permitted Canada Post (the national
mail service) to use its monopoly on letter mail to cross-subsidize non-
monopolized businesses, including parcel delivery and courier services.5
UPS also alleged that Canada Post violated the obligation of national
treatment by giving its own courier businesses access to the national mail
distribution system, while denying similar access to United Parcel Service
Canada Ltd. 2 Furthermore, UPS asserted that these and several other
alleged violations of NAFTA (some of which do not fall within Chapter 11)
constituted a violation of the minimum standard of treatment, including fair
and equitable treatment.53
These claims indicate that Chapter 11 provides the tool for challenging a
wide variety of "measures," including laws and regulations that allegedly
protect public health, safety, and the environment; create import and export
45. Id. at 2-3.
46. Brower Remarks, supra note 22, at 14.
47. See Lafayette Place Assocs. v. Boston Redev. Auth., 694 N.E.2d 820 (Mass. 1998).
48. See Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, Notice of Arbitration, at paras. 127-33, 138-39, 141-
48, 150 (on file with Pepperdine Law Review).
49. See id. at paras. 130, 138, 141.
50. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration
Under Section B of Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (on file with
Pepperdine Law Review).
51. Id. at paras. 5-16.
52. See id. at para. 19.
53. See id. at paras. 25-3 1.
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controls; and implement treaties. In addition, Chapter 11 permits scrutiny of
important governmental services, including a judicial system that we regard
as a model for the rest of the world. This intrusion of international law into
the daily affairs of NAFTA countries has provoked an outcry against the
perceived chilling effect on regulatory programs and the corresponding
diminution of sovereignty."4 Chapter 11 has even drawn criticism from a
prominent international lawyer who describes Chapter 11 as a "bizarre
human rights treaty.., for a special-interest group" that provides NAFTA
investors with "direct access to ... denationalized adjudication of any
governmental measure that interferes with their ample rights.""
Herein lies the irony of Chapter 11: the U.S. government expected it to
provide a depoliciticized method of protecting U.S investors against the
arbitrary conduct of Mexican officials. Instead, the promiscuous use of
Chapter 11 to challenge public regulatory laws in Canada and the U.S. has
thrust it into the center of a highly politicized debate, in which participants
question the compatibility of Canadian and U.S. sovereignty with traditional
principles of international law. While Mexico remains committed to
Chapter 11 as written,56 the Canadian government and parts of the U.S.
government have proposed the adoption of binding interpretive statements to
limit Chapter 1 l's substantive obligations.57 Most writers either concur" or
urge a retreat from unfettered access to investor-state arbitration of Chapter
11 claims.59
54. See supra notes 6-14 and accompanying text.
55. Josd E. Alvarez, Critical Theory and the North American Free Trade Agreement's Chapter
Eleven, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 303, 307-08 (1997).
56. See Safrin et al., supra note 12, at 726 n.56 (observing that the Mexican government opposes
any changes to the Chapter 11 process); Ferguson, supra note 5, at 516 (describing the Mexican
government's satisfaction with the Chapter 11 process and its corresponding reluctance to make any
changes). See also Mann, supra note 3, at 407 (stating that Mexico expects pending cases to resolve
public concerns).
57. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. But see Brower & Steven, supra note 15, at 194;
Byrne, supra note 8, at 433; Loritz, supra note 3, at 549-5 1.
III. BALANCING ACCESS AND THE MERITS
Any system for resolving investor-state disputes must balance two
objectives. First, it must provide investors with liberal access to a forum in
which to present complaints.' Second, the selected mechanism must not
create ideal standards that conflict with the regulatory practices of most
orderly states.6 It seems evident that public anxiety about Chapter 11 rests
on the untested premise that it lacks balance and favors the interests of
foreign investors over the public interest; hence, the perceived need to
restore equilibrium by limiting access to investor-state arbitration or by
restricting the substantive obligations of Chapter 11. Several recent awards
provide an important opportunity to determine whether arbitral tribunals can
strike a balance that should diminish the opposition to Chapter 11.
Part III argues that most Chapter 11 tribunals have adopted interpretive
strategies that promote access to investor-state arbitration but do not impose
unrealistic standards of conduct on NAFTA Parties. Part III(A) explains that
most tribunals have adopted flexible interpretations of Section B's
provisions on procedure and jurisdiction, thus promoting access to
arbitration and a hearing on the merits. Part III(B) describes the
countervailing tendency of tribunals to adhere more rigorously to the treaty's
text and specific rules of international law in construing Section A's
provisions on liability. As critics feared, extravagant claims will often
survive procedural and jurisdictional objections. Yet, critics have
overestimated the capacity of such claims to pass through the rigorous filter
of substantive disciplines. Thus, the emerging case law suggests that
Chapter 11 gives investors broad opportunities to complain, but subjects
their allegations to a level of scrutiny that provides adequate protection
against abusive claims.
A. Access to Investor-State Arbitration
Section B of Chapter 11 "establishes a mechanism for the settlement of
investment disputes that assures.., due process before an impartial
[arbitral] tribunal."62 Viewed in isolation, however, certain provisions of
Section B seem to impose requirements that limit access to investor-state
arbitration. For example, claimants must establish that they qualify as
60. John T. Schmidt, Arbitration Under the Auspices of the International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID): Implications of the Decision on Jurisdiction in Alcoa Minerals of
Jamaica, Inc. v. Government of Jamaica, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 90, 103-04 (1976).
61. Philip C. Jessup, Responsibility of States for Injuries to Individuals, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 903,
914 (1946).
62. NAFrA, supra note 1, at art. 1115, 32 I.L.M. at 642.
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"investors" in another NAFTA Party.63  Their claims must also involve
"investment disputes" in the sense that they challenge measures "relating to"
investors or investments.' Furthermore, in submitting claims, investors
must include a written consent to arbitration and a waiver of the right to
initiate or continue any other dispute resolution proceedings with respect to
the allegedly offending measure, except for certain proceedings for
extraordinary relief not involving the payment of damages.65 If the investor
initiates a claim on behalf of an enterprise of another NAFIA Party that it
owns or controls, the investor must also submit a waiver executed by that
enterprise.'
Citing these provisions, disputing NAFTA Parties frequently seek
partial or complete dismissal on the grounds that the claimants lack an
investment; the claims do not involve investment disputes; claimants have
improperly raised "new claims" based on events that occurred after the
commencement of arbitration; and the claimants have submitted untimely or
insufficient waivers. While individual provisions of Chapter 11 might
appear to support such objections, most tribunals have construed those
provisions in light of their purpose and context, which includes the creation
of a dispute resolution process that assures "due process" before an impartial
tribunal. Because "[1]ading th[e] process with a long list of mandatory
preconditions.., would defeat that objective," most tribunals have flexibly
construed procedural and jurisdictional rules to promote access to arbitration
and examination of claims on the merits.67 Nonetheless, tribunals have
indicated that they will not use flexible constructions to reward claimants
who engage in seriously abusive behavior.
63. Id. at art. 1116 (authorizing "investors" to submit claims on their own behalf); id. at 1117
(authorizing "investors" to submit claims on behalf of enterprises they own or control), 32 I.L.M. at
642-43.
64. Id. at arts. 1101(1), 1115, 32 I.L.M. at 639, 642.
65. Id. at art. 1121(1), 32 I.L.M. at 643.
66. Id. at art. 1121(2), 32 I.L.M. at 643. In 'addition, investors cannot submit a claim to
arbitration until six months have elapsed since the events giving rise to the claim. Id. at art. 1120(1),
32 I.L.M. at 643. Before actually submitting a claim, investors must also wait for 90 days after
giving the disputing NAFTA Party notice of intent to submit the claim to arbitration. Id. at art. 1119,
32 I.L.M. at 642. Finally, investors may not submit a claim to arbitration if more than three years
have elapsed from the date on which the investor acquired (or should have acquired) both knowledge
of the alleged breach and the occurrence of loss or damage. See id. at arts. 1116(2), 1117(2), 32
I.L.M. at 642-43.
67. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Award Concerning the Motion by Government of Canada
Respecting the Claim Based Upon Imposition of the "Super Fee," at para. 26 (Aug. 7, 2000)
(NAFTA/UNCITRAL), available at http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b3P&T.htm.
1. Lack of an Investment
Section A of Chapter 11 regulates measures that relate to "investors"
and "investments."68  Likewise, Section B of Chapter 11 establishes
procedures for resolving "investment disputes."'69 Disputing NAFTA Parties
have frequently sought dismissal on the grounds that claimants lacked
investments or did not challenge measures "relating" to investments.
In S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, the claimant (SDMI) alleged that its
operations in Canada alone and jointly with S.D. Myers (Canada), Inc.
(Myers Canada) constituted an investment within the meaning of Article
1 139.7 Canada requested dismissal on the grounds that Myers Canada did
not constitute an investment of SDMI because the individual members of the
Myers family held the stock of both corporations.7' Thus, although the two
businesses were affiliates, SDMI technically did not own or control Myers
Canada." Because the three-year limitations period of Chapter 11 would
likely have prevented the individual owners of Myers Canada from bringing
a separate claim,7" SDMI sought to establish a Canadian investment on a
number of other alternative grounds."
"Taking into account the objectives of the NAFTA," the tribunal could
"not accept that an otherwise meritorious claim should fail solely by reason
of the [formal] corporate structure" adopted by a family business.75 Since
the evidence established that both corporations remained within the Myers
family and under the control of one individual, the tribunal concluded that
Myers Canada qualified as an investment of SDMI for purposes of Chapter
I 7 As a result, the tribunal did not address SDMI's alternative arguments
on jurisdiction.77
In Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, a U.S. investor claimed that its
investment in a Canadian lumber company had been expropriated by
regulations requiring export permits for - and payment of fees on - certain
lumber exports to the United States. Canada responded that the claim did
not relate to the investment of an investor because access to the U.S. market
does not constitute "property included within the definition of an investment
68. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1101(1), 32 I.L.M. at 639.
69. Id. at art. 1115, 32 I.L.M. at 642.
70. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award, at para. 222 (Nov. 13, 2000)
(NAFTAIJNCITRAL), available at http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b2myers.htm.
71. Id.
72. Id. at para. 227.
73. SDMI challenged a measure imposed on November 20, 1995, but did not submit the claim to
arbitration until October 30, 1998. Id. at paras. 12, 123.
74. Id. at para. 232.
75. Id. at para. 229.
76. Id. at paras. 227, 229, 231.
77. Id. at para. 232.
78. Pope & Talbot, Statement of Claim, supra note 35, at 23-27.
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under Article 1139."' 9 Instead of trying to bring the concept of "market
access" within the specific definition of an investment, the tribunal ruled that
the Canadian subsidiary was an investment, that U.S. sales constituted a
large part of the investment's business, and that those sales affected the
investment's value.0 Viewed from this broader perspective, the tribunal
denied Canada's objection because the export restrictions related to an
"investment" as defined in Article 1139.81
2. Investment Disputes
Several U.S. investors have challenged Canadian restrictions on the
import or export of goods. In these cases, Canada has routinely argued that
such claims do not involve investment disputes, but constitute "trade
disputes" falling within the substantive disciplines of Chapter 3 (trade in
goods) and the remedial provisions of Chapter 20 (state-to-state disputes). 2
Citing the text of Article 1101 and GATT jurisprudence, Canada has
maintained that the challenged measures do not "relate to" investments
because they are "primarily aimed at" trade in goods. 3 In two of three
awards to consider this issue, Chapter 11 tribunals held outright that
measures directed at trade in goods may also "relate to" investments if the
measures directly affect the value of investments.' In the third award, the
tribunal declined to issue a definitive ruling, but indicated that Canada's
objection lacked merit. Thus, while isolated quotes from Article 1101 and
GATT jurisprudence might have supported a dichotomy between trade and
investment disputes, arbitrators evidently realized that this distinction would
79. Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Interim Award, at paras. 87, 95 (June 26, 2000)
(NAFTAIUNCITRAL), available at http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b3P&T.htm.
80. Id. at para. 98.
81. Id.
82. See S.D. Myers, Partial Award, at paras. 236, 297. See also Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Award
in Relation to the Preliminary Motion by the Government of Canada, at paras. 19(3), 31-32 (Jan. 26,
2000) (NAFTAIUNCITRAL), available at http://www.appletonlawcom/4b3P&T.htm; Ethyl Corp.
v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction, at para. 62 (June 24, 1998) (NAFTA/UNCITRAL), reprinted in
38 I.L.M. 708,725 (1999).
83. Pope & Talbot, Award in Relation to the Preliminary Motion by the Government of Canada,
at paras. 27-28 (Jan. 26, 2000).
84. S.D. Myers, Partial Award, at paras. 294-95 (Nov. 13, 2000). See also id. at paras. 61-62
(separate opinion of Bryan Schwartz); Pope & Talbot, Award in Relation to the Preliminary Motion
by the Government of Canada, at paras. 33-34 (Jan. 26, 2000).
85. Ethyl Corp., Award on Jurisdiction, at paras. 63-64 (June 24, 1998), 38 I.L.M. at 725 (noting
that Canada "cite[d] no authority" and did not "elaborate any argument" to support its position,
observing that Canada did not require an immediate decision of the issue, and declining to exclude
Ethyl's claim at the present time).
frustrate the purpose of investor-state arbitration by permitting NAFTA
Parties to avoid scrutiny of harmful measures directed at the goods that
investments consume or produce.
3. New Claims
Like many international tribunals, Chapter 11 tribunals have no
authority to enjoin disputing parties from engaging in behavior alleged to
constitute a violation of their treaty obligations.6 This leaves NAFTA
Parties free to maintain or modify challenged measures, thus increasing the
likelihood of injury during the course of arbitration. When investors have
claimed damages for subsequently occurring events, however, NAFTA
Parties have objected on the grounds that they constitute "new claims" that
must be submitted to separate arbitrations in accordance with the procedural
requirements of Section B. Although Chapter 11 tribunals have consistently
rejected the inadmissibility of such claims per se, they have not adopted a
uniform conceptual framework for dealing with this issue.
In Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, the investor submitted a claim
challenging Canadian regulations imposing fees on certain lumber exports to
the United States. Nine months later, the Canadian and U.S. governments
agreed to impose additional fees on exports from British Columbia." The
investor first challenged this "super fee" in its memorial some thirteen
months after commencement of the arbitration."8 Canada objected on the
grounds that (1) the regulations implementing the "super fee" represented a
new measure that required submission of a separate claim in accordance
with the procedural requirements of Section B, and (2) the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules require claimants to identify their positions clearly in their
statements of claim.89 The investor replied that (1) the new regulations
merely adjusted existing measures so as to cause additional harm, (2) its
statement of claim covered any modifications of the challenged regulations,
and (3) disputing parties should not escape review by modifying challenged
measures during the course of an arbitration." The tribunal agreed that the
investor's statement of claim challenged the export regulations as an
evolving phenomenon and that the "super fee" simply represented a new
86. Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, Ruling by Tribunal on Claimants' Motion for Interim
Measures (Jan. 7, 2000) (NAFTAIUNCITRAL), available at http://www.appletonlaw.com/
4b3P&T.htm. See also Dearden, supra note 4, at 127.
87. Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, Award Concerning the Motion by Government of Canada
Respecting the Claim Based Upon Imposition of the "Super Fee," at para. 3 (Aug. 7, 2000)
(NAFTA/UNCITRAL), available at. http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b3P&T.htm.
88. Id. at paras. 2, 4.
89. Id. at paras. 4-8.
90. Id. atparas. 12-13.
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aspect of the challenged regime. "' As a result, the circumstances did not
require amendment of the investor's claim. 2
In Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, the notice of arbitration challenged a
legislative proposal to ban the importation of (and inter-provincial trade in)
the fuel additive MMT and did not specifically refer to a product known as
"Greenburn."93  The statement of claim, however, referred to the
subsequently enacted Canadian legislation and its effect on "Greenburn."'
Canada objected on the grounds that the investor had asserted "new claims"
lying beyond the tribunal's competence." The tribunal acknowledged that
the references to "Greenburn" arguably constituted an elaboration of claims
identified in the notice of arbitration but held that, "if anything," they
amended the notice of arbitration.96  In discussing the propriety of
amendments under the UNCITRAL Rules, the tribunal noted that Article 20
generally permits amendments unless the tribunal considers them
inappropriate given the likelihood of delay or prejudice.97 Finding nothing to
rebut this "presumption of amendability," the tribunal rejected Canada's
objections.98
In Metalciad Corp. v. Mexico, the investor filed a notice of intent, in
which it challenged the denial of a construction permit." Later, the investor
submitted a memorial that referred to a subsequent decree that transformed
the construction site into an ecological preserve. Mexico objected on the
grounds that "Chapter Eleven does not contemplate the amendment of
ripened claims to include post-claim events."'" The investor responded that
policies related to the administration of justice favored consideration of such
"new claims."'' For example, the failure to hear such claims could deprive
investors of redress during the period in which NAFTA Parties would be
most inclined to disregard their treaty obligations."°  Likewise, the
91. Id. at paras. 24-25.
92. Id. at para. 28.
93. Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction, at para. 93 (June 24, 1998)
(NAFrA/UNCITRAL), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 708, 730 (1999).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at paras. 94-95, 38 I.L.M. at 730.
97. Id. at para. 95.
98. Id.
99. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Arbitral Award, at para. 64 (Aug. 30, 2000) (NAFTA/ICSID
Add'l Facility), available at-http://www.pearcelaw.com/metalclad.html.
100. Id.
101. Id. at para. 65.
102. Id.
presentation of related claims ad seriatim would create serious
inefficiencies. '3
The tribunal evidently treated the situation as one involving the
amendment of a claim. It agreed that efficiency and equity require some
opportunity for amendment; however, the tribunal also recognized that
principles of fairness and clarity impose certain limitations on the
amendment process." The tribunal held that Article 48(2) of the Additional
Facility Rules strikes an appropriate balance by generally requiring investors
to present ancillary claims no later than in their replies."5 Since the investor
had challenged the ecological decree in its memorial, the tribunal concluded
that it had presented the claim "in a timely manner and consistently with the
principles of fairness and clarity.""
As the foregoing cases demonstrate, tribunals have rejected the
formalistic argument that "new claims" require the initiation of separate
proceedings. In so doing, they have paid respect to Chapter I l's objective of
providing liberal access to investor-state arbitration. Chapter 11 tribunals,
however, have not adopted a uniform analytical framework for dealing with
such claims. At least two tribunals (the Pope & Talbot and Ethyl Corp.
tribunals) have suggested that related events may fall within the scope of the
original claim and, therefore, may not require amendment. On the other
hand, two tribunals have recognized that the assertion of some claims may
require formal amendment in accordance with the applicable arbitration
rules. While the UNCITRAL Rules appear to provide an open-ended
presumption of amendability, the Additional Facility Rules apply this
presumption only until the claimant's reply, after which they apply the
opposite presumption.
Thus, the admissibility of "new claims" depends in part on how
investors draft their notices of arbitration and the arbitration rules they
select. Investors who want to assert "new claims" without amendment
should draft notices of arbitration and statements of claim that describe the
offending measures at a high level of generality and challenge them as
evolving phenomena. In addition, investors who wish to maintain an open-
ended presumption of amendability may prefer the UNCITRAL Rules to the
Additional Facility Rules. Investors should, however, recognize certain
limits on the assertion of "new claims." While Chapter 11 tribunals have
given liberal consideration to "new claims" made in good faith, they have
recognized the need to ensure that the assertion of "new claims" does not
result in undue delay, prejudice, or unfairness to disputing NAFTA Parties.
103. See id.
104. Id. at paras. 67-68.
105. Id. at para. 68.
106. Id. at para. 69.
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It seems unlikely that Chapter 11 tribunals will permit investors to raise
"new claims" in situations that might create an unfair advantage.
4. Waivers
Article 1121 sets forth the "conditions precedent" to "submission of a
claim to arbitration."'' 7  Among other things, Article 1121(1)(b) requires
investors to waive their right to initiate or continue any other dispute
settlement procedures with respect to the measures alleged to breach Chapter
11, except for certain actions for extraordinary relief not involving the
payment of damages. 8 When investors assert claims on behalf of their
owned or controlled enterprises, Article 1121(2)(b) also requires the
submission of waivers executed by those enterprises."° The waivers "shall"
be in writing and included in the "submission to arbitration," which means
the notice of arbitration under the UNCITRAL and Additional Facility
Rules."' In a number of cases, NAFTA Parties have sought dismissal on the
grounds that investors submitted untimely waivers, provided substantively
insufficient waivers, or continued to pursue related claims for damages
before domestic tribunals.
In Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, the investor failed to include written waivers
in its notice of arbitration, but submitted them instead with its statement of
claim."' Relying on the clear textual references to "conditions precedent"
and the time for submitting waivers, Canada argued that the untimely
waivers created a jurisdictional defect."2  While conceding that a
substantively sufficient waiver represents a condition precedent to
consideration of the merits, the investor argued that Article 1121 establishes
the conditions for admissibility of claims as opposed to the tribunal's
jurisdiction."'3 These arguments required the tribunal to decide whether the
NAFTA Parties intended to give jurisdictional significance to the
contemporaneous submission of waivers and notices of arbitration."' After
examining Article 1121, the tribunal gained "no insight" into its purpose
beyond the evident function of memorializing a waiver already implied by
107. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1121, 32 I.L.M. 605, 643 (1993).
108. Id. at art. 1121(l)(b).
109. Id.
110. Id. at art. 1137(1), 32 I.L.M at 646.
111. See Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction, at para. 89 (June 24, 1998)
(NAFTA/UNCITRAL), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 708, 729 (1999).
112. See id.
113. See id. at para. 74-75, 38 I.L.M. at 727 (emphasis added).
114. See id. at para. 74.
the act of initiating arbitral proceedings."5 Under the circumstances, the
tribunal could not accept Canada's argument that the NAFTA Parties
intended to give timely submission of waivers the "drastically preclusive
effect" of determining jurisdiction."6 Accordingly, the tribunal held that the
investor's delayed compliance with Article 1121 lacked jurisdictional
significance."7 The tribunal suggested, however, that persistent or prolonged
noncompliance with Article 1121 could warrant dismissal on the grounds of
inadmissibility."8
In Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, the investor timely submitted its own
waiver and the waiver of a Canadian investment, Pope & Talbot Ltd., in
March 1999."' Later, in its statement of claim, the investor referred to
damages arising out of its investment in another Canadian company, Harmac
Pacific Inc.'2°  Since Harmac had not executed its own waiver, Canada
argued that the investor could not state a claim on its behalf.' Although the
investor submitted a waiver on behalf of the Harmac business in January
2000, Canada urged the tribunal to dismiss the "Harmac claim" because the
three-year limitations period expired before submission of the waiver.'12 The
tribunal rejected the limitations argument on factual grounds and, further,
disagreed "that the underlying claim is perfected only when the waiver is
submitted.' 23 Like its counterpart in Ethyl Corp., the tribunal viewed "the
initiation of arbitral proceedings... as a constructive waiver."'24 The Pope
& Talbot tribunal, however, held that the Article 1121 waiver qualifies the
constructive waiver in a significant way.'2 According to the tribunal, the
initiation of arbitration arguably waives the right to initiate or maintain any
other proceedings, whereas the written waiver establishes an intention of not
waiving the right to seek certain extraordinary relief under the law of the
disputing NAFTA Party.'26 Thus, written waivers do not protect the
115. Id. at para. 90, 38 I.L.M. at 729.
116. Id. at para. 91.
117. See id.
118. Id. at paras. 75, 91, 38 I.L.M. at 727, 729.
119. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Award in Relation to Preliminary Motion by Government
of Canada to Strike Paragraphs 34 and 103 of the Statement of the Claim from the Record (the
"Harmac Motion"), at paras. 3-4 (Feb. 24, 2000) (NAFTA/UNCITRAL), available at
http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b3P&T.htm.
120. See id. at para. 15.
121. See id. at para. 2.
122. See id. at paras. 5-9.
123. Id. at paras. 12-13.
124. Id. at para. 16.
125. See id.
126. See id. (emphasis added).
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disputing NAFTA Parties, they protect investors.'27 As a result, the failure to
execute a waiver cannot by itself prejudice a disputing NAFTA Party.'28
Although the Pope & Talbot tribunal declined to interpret Article 1121
as a provision of jurisdictional significance, it recognized that two
consequences may flow from non-compliance with Article 1121. First, the
tribunal explicitly held that Article 1121 prevents tribunals from entertaining
the merits of claims before submission of a proper waiver, thus implying
that it establishes conditions for the admissibility of claims.'29 Second, the
tribunal implied that dismissal might be warranted if the non-compliance
resulted in prejudice, for example through the contemporaneous initiation of
related claims for damages before domestic tribunals.3°
In subsequent proceedings, Canada objected to Pope & Talbot's
assertion of "new claims" without the submission of new waivers."'
Exasperated at Canada's continued use of formalistic arguments to obstruct
the adjudication of claims brought in good faith, the tribunal provided
explicit guidance for the interpretation of Chapter l1's provisions on
procedure and jurisdiction:
[A]s rulings by this Tribunal and the Ethyl Tribunal have found,
strict adherence to the letter of... NAFTA [A]rticles [1116-1122]
is not necessarily a precondition to arbitrability, but must be
analyzed within the context of the objective of NAFTA in
establishing investment dispute arbitration in the first place. That
objective, found in Article 1115, is to provide a mechanism for the
settlement of investment disputes that assures "due process" before
an impartial tribunal. Lading that process with a long list of
mandatory preconditions, applicable without consideration of their
context, would defeat that objective, particularly if employed with
draconian zeal.'32
Taken together, the Ethyl Corp. and Pope & Talbot awards reinforce the
emerging trend of flexibly interpreting Section B to promote access to
investor-state arbitration. At the same time; both tribunals carefully
127. See id.
128. Id.
129. See id. atpara. 18.
130. See id.
131. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Award Concerning the Motion by Government of Canada
Respecting the Claim Based Upon Imposition of the "Super Fee," at paras. 7-8 (Aug. 7, 2000)
(NAFTA/UNCITRAL), available at http://www.appletonlaw.com /4b3P&T.htm.
132. See id. at para. 26 (second emphasis added).
affirmed their inherent power to control their dockets and to deal with
serious prejudice by dismissing claims.
According to one observer, however, the Ethyl Corp. and Pope & Talbot
awards conflict with the subsequent decision in Waste Management, Inc. v.
Mexico.'33 In that case, a U.S. investor submitted a claim on behalf of itself
and its Mexican investment." With its claim, the investor submitted waivers
of its own and its investment's rights to initiate or continue other
proceedings with respect to the challenged measures, subject to the
"understanding" that the waiver did not apply to "any dispute settlement
proceedings involving allegations that [Mexico] ... violated duties imposed
by sources of law other than Chapter Eleven... including the municipal law
of Mexico." 3  Following submission of the claim to arbitration, the
investment maintained two related claims for damages in Mexican courts
and initiated a third-claim before a Mexican arbitral tribunal.36 Under the
circumstances, Mexico argued that the Chapter 11 tribunal lacked
jurisdiction because the investor had not provided the waiver required by
Article 1121 and, moreover, had acted in a manner inconsistent with the
waiver required by Article 1121.37
In an award dismissing the claim for lack of jurisdiction, the tribunal
made several assertions that arguably contradict the letter and the spirit of
the Ethyl Corp. and Pope & Talbot awards. For example, all members of
the tribunal agreed that a substantively deficient waiver would constitute a
jurisdictional defect.'38 In addition, all members of the tribunal agreed that
they had an obligation to monitor the investor's post-submission conduct.'39
Finally, observers have identified a number of statements that seem to
restrict access to investor-state arbitration, including the tribunal's insistence
on "clear, explicit, and categorical" waivers and the tribunal's recognition of
its obligation to devote the "utmost attention" to assessing the fulfillment of
conditions precedent. 40
133. William S. Dodge, International Decision, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 186, 190 (2001).
134. Waste Mgmt. Inc. v. United Mexican States, Arbitral Award (June 2, 2000) (NAFTA/ICSID
Add'l Facility), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/awards.htm.
135. Id. at §5.
136. See id. at §§ 6, 25.
137. See id. at §§ 6-7.
138. The majority held that the investor submitted a substantively insufficient waiver in the sense
that the investor did not waive the right to pursue related claims for damages under Mexican law.
See id. at §§ 27(b), 28, 30, 31. The dissenting arbitrator agreed that a substantively insufficient
waiver would create a jurisdictional defect. See id. at para. 58 (dissenting opinion of Keith Highet).
However, the dissenting arbitrator concluded that Article 1121 does not require the waiver of claims
under Mexican law that partially overlap with Chapter 11 claims but do not by themselves constitute
Chapter 11 claims. See id. at paras. 41-43.
139. The majority indicated that conduct frustrating' the waiver's purpose constitutes a
jurisdictional defect, while the dissenting arbitrator concluded that such behavior only affects the
admissibility of claims. See id. (majority award) §§ 26-31, (dissenting opinion) at paras. 58-59.
140. See Dodge, supra note 133, at 190. See also Waste Mgmt., Arbitral Award, at §§ 17-18 (June
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Certainly, the Waste Management award does not suggest an unflagging
commitment to the promotion of access to investor-state arbitration. The
award may encourage NAFTA Parties to make jurisdictional objections
based on formalistic arguments. One hopes, however, that arbitrators will
recognize that the result in Waste Management remains absolutely consistent
with the Ethyl Corp. and Pope & Talbot awards. The Waste Management
tribunal ordered dismissal because the investor, by word and deed, persisted
(for fourteen months) in denying any intention to waive the right to pursue
related claims for damages under Mexican law, as required by Article
1121 . 4  The Ethyl Corp. tribunal suggested that such prolonged non-
compliance with Article 1121 might warrant dismissal, albeit on the grounds
of inadmissibility.' 2 After the investor in Waste Management explicitly
discontinued all Mexican proceedings at the eleventh hour and expressed a
desire to cure any jurisdictional defects, the dissenting arbitrator argued that
remediation was possible.' 3 The Pope & Talbot tribunal, however, suggested
that delayed compliance with Article 1121 might not cure defects if the
investor's conduct resulted in prejudice.'" Thus, the Ethyl Corp. and Pope
& Talbot awards support dismissal of the Waste Management claim.
While all the three tribunals probably would have dismissed the claim in
Waste Management, one possible inconsistency remains: whereas the Ethyl
Corp. and Pope & Talbot tribunals arguably would have held the claim to be
inadmissible, the Waste Management tribunal concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction. One may resolve this apparent tension by distinguishing
between vexatious behavior that seriously impedes the process of
adjudication and conduct that repudiates, waives, or vitiates consent to
arbitration. When parties seriously obstruct the arbitral process, tribunals
may respond by invoking their inherent power to manage their dockets and
to dismiss vexatious claims over which jurisdiction exists.'45 In other words,
2, 2000).
141. See Waste Mgmt., Arbitral Award, at §§ 25-31 (June 2, 2000).
142. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
143. See Waste Mgmt., Arbitral Award, at para. 52 & n.41 (June 2, 2000) (dissenting opinion).
144. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
145. See English Arbitration Act of 1996, § 41(3), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 155, 174 (1997)
(authorizing tribunals to dismiss claims if the claimant has caused "inordinate and inexcusable
delay" that creates "a substantial risk that it is not possible to have a fair resolution of... that claim"
or is likely to cause "serious prejudice to the respondent"). A number of U.S. federal courts have
likewise described forum non conveniens dismissals as an exercise of the "inherent power.., to
control the administration of the litigation... .and to prevent its process from becoming an
instrument of abuse, injustice and oppression." Baumgart v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 981 F.2d 824,
828 (5th Cir. 1993). See also Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215, 1218 (11th Cir. 1985)
(exercising inherent power is essential to the administration of justice); Karim v. Finch Shipping
the tribunal may declare all or part of the claim inadmissible. When parties
conduct themselves in prejudicial ways that are totally inconsistent with
consent to arbitration, they may be deemed to have repudiated or waived
their consent to arbitration.' 6 Likewise, an investor's behavior might
become so abusive that it vitiates the consent of a NAFTA Party to
arbitration because no sovereign state would agree to arbitration under such
conditions. In either case, the conduct effectively destroys the arbitration
agreement and, with it, the tribunal's jurisdiction.'47
The Waste Management tribunal admittedly did not rely on the
distinction between merely prejudicial behavior and conduct that vitiates
consent to arbitration. The facts of the case, however, support the
application of this distinction,' 8 which restores a sense of harmony to the
three awards.' 9  If accepted, this distinction could frustrate Waste
Management's subsequent effort to refile its claim.5° Assuming that the
jurisdictional defect resulted from destruction of the arbitration agreement,
the majority's award would seem to constitute res judicata on that issue.
Presumably, termination of the arbitration agreement would leave the second
tribunal with no basis for jurisdiction. This seems consistent with the first
tribunal's award, which did not contemplate that the investor could refile its
claim."'
Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 727, 736 (E.D. La. 2000) (preventing abuse of Court's process is inherent
power); Tjontveit v. Den Norske Bank ASA, 997 F. Supp. 799, 803 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (declining to
exercise jurisdiction is inherent in Court's power to control litigation).
146. See, e.g., Worldsource Coil Coating, Inc. v. McGraw Constr. Co., 946 F.2d 473, 476 (6th Cir.
1991) (holding that a party waives its right to arbitration where "its action.., is so inconsistent with
arbitration as to indicate an abandonment of that act"); Fisher v. A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc., 791 F.2d
691, 694 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding waiver to be disfavored but found where the party asserting
waiver: "(1) has knowledge of an existing right... ; (2) acts inconsistent with that existing right, and
(3) prejudice to the party opposing arbitration .. "); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to
Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1377, 1403 (1991) (illustrating that parties may waive an arbitration
right).
147. Article 11(3) of the New York Convention does not require enforcement of "inoperable"
arbitration agreements. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, art. 11(3), 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3. These include agreements that a
party has waived, revoked, or terminated. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 301 (2d ed. 1994); ALBERT J. VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW
YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958, at 158 (1981). They also include agreements to which
one party's consent has been vitiated. See Toby Landau, Composition and Establishment of the
Tribunal: Articles 14 to 36, 9 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 45, 104 (1998) (explaining that a "total
challenge" to an arbitration clause exists when "consent to arbitration has been vitiated").
148. See BORN, supra note 147, at 281-82 (explaining that the initiation of and substantial
participation in judicial proceedings "would often constitute a waiver of arbitration" if the
proceedings are inconsistent with the arbitration agreement).
149. See Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction, at para. 59 (June 24, 1998)
(NAFTA/UNCiTRAL), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 708, 724 (1999) (recognizing that consent provides
the "sole basis of jurisdiction" in Chapter 11 proceedings).
150. See NAFTA: U.S. Waste Control Firm Refiles Case Under NAFTA Investor-State Provisions,
17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1528 (Oct. 5, 2000).
151. See Dodge, supra note 133, at 190.
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5. Conclusions on Access
The foregoing cases indicate that, when required to interpret Section B
of Chapter 11, tribunals have adopted a flexible approach favoring the
promotion of access to investor-state arbitration - even when isolated treaty
provisions might support a different result. In addition to the rulings already
discussed, one might also mention Azinian v. Mexico, in which the investor
brought an expropriation claim based on the alleged breach of a concession
agreement.' The tribunal held that the claim failed because. Mexican courts
had ruled that no contract existed and the investor did not challenge the
Mexican court proceedings as a denial of justice.'53 Even so, the tribunal
examined the Mexican proceedings because it did not "wish to create the
impression that the Claimants [lost] on account of an improperly pleaded
case."'54 Another tribunal refused to dismiss a claim, in which the
challenged action (a legislative proposal) did not initially constitute a
measure "adopted" or "maintained" by a Party, but subsequently achieved
that status following submission of the claim to arbitration.' 5  The same
tribunal also refused to dismiss the claim even though the investor
commenced arbitral proceedings before the expiration of the six-month
cooling-off period prescribed by Article 1120(1). 56 The tribunal explained
that "dismissal... would disserve, rather than serve, the object and purpose
of NAFTA."'"
These decisions suggest that NAFTA Parties will rarely secure dismissal
of extravagant claims at an early stage. Opponents of Chapter 11 will likely
characterize the procedural victories of investors as proof of an unbalanced
investment regime. For two reasons, such arguments fall wide of the mark.
First, tribunals have indicated that they will not use flexible interpretations
of Section B to permit the assertion of truly abusive claims. Second, as
described in Part III(B), tribunals have rigorously examined the merits of
claims in light of the treaty's text and specific rules of international law.
The public should not fear decisions that favor the creation of opportunities
for foreign investors to assert large claims against NAFTA Parties; those
152. Azinian v. Mexico, Arbitral Award, at para. 100 (Nov. 1, 1999) (NAFrA/ICSID Add'l
Facility), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/awards.htm.
153. Id.
154. Id. at para. 101.
155. See Ethyl Corp., Award on Jurisdiction, at paras. 65-69 (June 24, 1998)
(NAFTAIUNCITRAL), 38 I.L.M. at 725-26.
156. See id. at paras. 79-85, 38 I.L.M. at 728-29.
157. See id. at para. 85, 38 I.L.M. at 729.
decisions merely represent the initial phase of a mechanism that achieves
balance in due course.
8
B. Examination of the Merits in Investor-State Arbitration
A recent article about Chapter 11 asks "what all.the furor is about" and
concludes that it boils down to a fear that "arbitral tribunals... may not
make the right decisions."'' 9 The article responds to such apprehensions by
referring to the "long history" of investor-state disputes and the "highly
competent members of academia and the international bar" who serve as
arbitrators.'" While accurate, these statements do not necessarily contradict
Philip Jessup's observation that "writers and judges ... have all too often set
up... an ideal condition which rarely exists and have tended to assert a
perfect international standard which does not reflect actual conditions in the
most orderly states."'6 ' To diffuse the opposition to Chapter 11, one must
demonstrate that tribunals have not exposed the NAFTA Parties to
unrealistic standards of conduct or liability.
As explained below, Chapter 11 tribunals have decided the merits of
several claims alleged to involve expropriation, performance requirements,
158. Some writers argue that the expense of defending meritless claims can threaten the regulatory
sovereignty of NAFTA Parties. See Byme, supra note 8, at 434; Ganguly, supra note 3, at 115. See
also MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 3, at 17 ("Just the ability ... to launch Chapter I 1
challenges.., presents a serious obstacle to regulatory action."). Investors, however, have brought
only thirteen claims against NAFTA Parties before the end of 1999 and a fourteenth claim in 2000.
See Safrin et al., supra note 12, at 724. See also supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
Investors failed to pursue two of those claims, and a tribunal dismissed a third claim on jurisdictional
grounds. See Soloway, The Challenge of Private Party Participation, supra note 3, at 12. See also
supra notes 133-51 and accompanying text. When compared to the volume of investment between
NAFTA Parties, the number of Chapter I I claims is fairly modest. See GOVERNMENT OF CANADA,
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, THE NAFTA AT FIVE YEARS 8
(1999) (stating that, in 1998, U.S. investment in Canada reached CDN$147.3 billion and that
Canadian investment in the United States reached CDN$126 billion). The expense of defending a
few meritless claims may be substantial, but it does not pose a serious threat to the regulatory
sovereignty of NAFTA Parties.
One should not forget that the pursuit of Chapter 11 claims also imposes substantial costs on
investors and that rational claimants will pursue only those actions that either have a reasonable
chance of success or great symbolic importance. Cf David G. Victor, The Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Agreement of the World Trade Organization: An Assessment After Five Years, 32
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 865, 897-98 (2000) (attributing the small number of claims under the SPS
Agreement to "extremely high" transaction costs, which limit claimants to bringing "winner
cases.., or highly symbolic cases in which the challenger is politically unable to avoid a dispute").
As tribunals continue to affirm the high threshold for establishing liability under Chapter 11, one can
expect a corresponding decrease in the number of claims and the aggregate cost of defending
Chapter 11 claims.
159. Brower & Steven, supra note 15, at 200. For avoidance of ambiguity, the reader should note
that Judge Brower is not the author of the present article and bears no responsibility for the views
expressed herein.
160. Id.
161. Jessup, supra note 61, at 914.
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national treatment, and the minimum standard of treatment. They have
examined claims rigorously in light of treaty provisions and specific rules of
international law. They have deferred substantially to municipal decision-
makers and have preserved the authority of NAFTA Parties to regulate in the
public interest. Two tribunals have imposed liability, but given the treaty
objectives of encouraging and protecting investment, it should come as no
surprise that tribunals have sustained meritorious claims.
1. Expropriation
Two issues have dominated cases involving allegations of expropriation
and measures tantamount to expropriation. First, these claims have required
tribunals to identify the degree of interference or deprivation that must occur
for liability to attach. Second, they have called on tribunals to determine
whether non-discriminatory regulations or, more narrowly, the exercise of
police powers can ever expose NAFTA Parties to liability. Contrary to the
predictions of some observers, tribunals have followed the principle that
governmental measures "may affect foreign interests considerably without
amounting to expropriation."'62
Article 1110(1) requires NAFTA Parties to compensate investors for
"expropriation" and measures "tantamount to expropriation" of investments,
but does not define either term. Some investors have described the latter
term as a lex specialis that requires compensation for measures that do not
rise to the level of a taking as defined by customary international law. 63
According to this view, NAFTA Parties must provide compensation for
measures that constitute a substantial interference with investments'
Examples of such measures supposedly include export fees that reduce
profits" and temporary or partial prohibitions of exports to the investor's
natural market."
Tribunals have uniformly rejected such arguments on the grounds that
the word "tantamount" means "equivalent."'67 Because Article 1110 only
162. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 535 (5th ed. 1998).
163. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award, at para. 285 (Nov. 13, 2000)
(NAFI'A/UNCITRAL), available at http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b2myers.htm; Metalclad Corp.
v. Mexico, Arbitral Award, at para. 27 (Aug. 30, 2000) (NAFTA/ICSID Add'l Facility), available at
http://www.pearcelaw.com/metalclad.html; Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Interim Award, at para. 84
(June 26, 2000) (NAFTA/UNCITRAL), available at http://www.appletonlaw.com4b3P&T.htm.
164. Pope & Talbot, Interim Award, at para. 103 (June 26, 2000). See also Dearden, supra note 4,
at 119-20; Mann, supra note 3, at 247.
165. See Pope & Talbot, Interim Award, at para. 101 (June 26, 2000).
166. See S.D. Myers, Partial Award, at paras. 285-87 (Nov. 13, 2000).
167. Id. at paras. 285-86; Pope & Talbot, Interim Award, at para. 104 (June 26, 2000).
requires compensation for measures "equivalent to expropriation," it does
not impose any greater liability than would otherwise exist under customary
international law.'68 Thus, in accordance with the prevailing view of
international law,'69 Chapter 11 tribunals require a substantial deprivation of
property rights for liability to attach.'70 Applying this standard, tribunals
have found no liability for export fees that reduce profits.' or export
prohibitions that temporarily cut off access to an investment's market.'
These decisions reinforce international law's tolerance of significant
interference with property rights.' They also suggest that many of the
pending expropriation claims are doomed to failure, particularly where they
seek to turn routine governmental actions into international disputes."4
Tribunals have been willing to find liability in situations that involve the
virtual confiscation of property or complete deprivation of control over
investments. For example, in Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, local authorities in
Guadalcazar denied a construction permit for a hazardous waste facility that
had received all necessary environmental approvals from the competent
168. S.D. Myers, Partial Award, at para. 286 (Nov. 13, 2000); Pope. & Talbot, Interim Award, at
paras. 96, 104 (June 26, 2000).
169. See Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy & Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Eng'rs of Iran, 6
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 219, 225 (1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 192 (1965); BROWNLIE, supra note 162, at 534; George H. Aldrich,
What Constitutes a Compensable Taking of Property? The Decisions of the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal, 88 AM. J INT'L L. 585, 589, 609 (1994); Rosalyn Higgins, The Taking of Property
by the State: Recent Developments in International Law, 176 RECUEIL DES COURS 259, 324 (1982
Ill); Giorgio Sacerdoti, Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment Protection,
269 RECUEIL DES COURS 251, 382-83 (1997).
170. S.D. Myers, Partial Award, at para. 282 (Nov. 13, 2000); id. at para. 211 (separate opinion of
Bryan Schwartz); Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Arbitral Award, at para. 103 (Aug. 30, 2000)
(NAFTA/ICSID Add'I Facility), available at http://www.pearcelaw.com/metalclad.html; Pope &
Talbot, Interim Award, at para. 102 (June 26, 2000).
171. Pope & Talbot, Interim Award, at paras. 101-02 (June 26, 2000).
172. S.D. Myers, Partial Award, at para. 288 (Nov. 13, 2000). Under international law, temporary
deprivations of property rights generally do not constitute expropriations. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712 reporters' note 6 (1987);
G.C. Christie, What Constitutes a Taking of Property Under International Law?, 1962 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 307, 337. Likewise, in cases involving the partial prohibition of a commercial activity, the
tendency is to resolve all doubts against the claimant. Christie, supra, at 335.
173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 192
cmt. b. (1965) ("Conduct attributable to a state may deprive an alien's property of value without
constituting a taking."); BROWNLIE, supra note 162, at 535 (observing that "[s]tate measures...
may affect foreign interests considerably without amounting to expropriation"); Christie, supra note
172, at 318 (recognizing situations in which "interference, although very substantial, has been held
not to constitute a 'taking'); Higgins, supra note 169, at 331 (stating that "interferences with
property for economic and financial regulatory purposes are tolerated to a significant degree");
Philip C. Jessup, Confiscation, 21 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 38, 39 (1927) (warning against the
"hasty" condemnation of governmental measures that injuriously affect property rights).
174. Azinian v. United Mexican States, Arbitral Award, at para. 87 (Nov. 1, 1999)
(NAFTA/ICSID Add'l Facility), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/awards.htm
(declining to construe Article 1110 to create a regime that would elevate "a multitude of ordinary
transactions with public authorities into potential international disputes").
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federal authorities.'75 In reaching their decision, the local authorities gave
the investor no notice, provided no opportunity to be heard, and identified no
construction defects in the facility.'76 Later, the outgoing governor of the
Mexican State of San Luis Potosi issued a decree incorporating the site into
an ecological preserve.'" The tribunal held that these two actions
permanently barred any operation of the facility and, therefore, constituted
an indirect expropriation and a measure tantamount to expropriation.'
The Metalclad award establishes that Chapter 11 places limits on the
extent to which NAFTA Parties may interfere with investments. It lends no
support, however, to the proposition that Chapter 11 undermines legitimate
regulatory programs. Since the competent federal authorities granted
Metalclad all necessary environmental approvals, the case does not
challenge Mexico's right to adopt appropriate environmental regulations.
Nor does the award challenge the right of Guadalcazar city authorities to
review applications for construction permits; it only prohibits them from
disregarding fundamental tenets of procedural justice and denying requests
without some identification of construction defects. Finally, the award does
not challenge the authority of Mexican state governors to establish
ecological preserves. It only requires them to provide compensation for the
economic destruction of investments operating lawfully and in compliance
with Mexican environmental laws. Such obligations pose no credible threat
to regulatory sovereignty.
Even though tribunals have adopted a fairly narrow definition of
expropriation, Canada has sought to prevent its application to regulatory
measures. According to Canada, international law does not require
compensation for "any loss sustained by the imposition of a non-
discriminatory, regulatory measure."'79 This formulation appears to conflate
two related principles.' First, bona fide regulations may substantially
interfere with the use of property, but they usually do not constitute a
substantial deprivation of property rights.'' Therefore, most regulations do
175. Metalclad, Arbitral Award, at paras. 52, 78, 80, 85-90'(Aug. 30, 2000).
176. Id. at paras. 91, 93.
177. Id. at paras. 109-10.
178. Id. at paras. 107, 109, 111.
179. Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Interim Award, at para. 90 (June 26, 2000)
(NAFrA/UNCITRAL), available at http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b3P&T.htm.
180. It would also seem to make liability for regulatory takings coextensive with the obligation of
national treatment.
181. B.A. WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 51 (1959) (explaining that
restrictions based on the principle of neighbourliness may be imposed without a deprivation of
property rights, but acknowledging that expropriation may occur when "the restrictions imposed
extend beyond the obligations of neighbourliness").
not meet the threshold definition of expropriation.'82 Second, the non-
discriminatory exercise of police powers (a narrow subset of regulations)
generally justifies deprivations that would otherwise constitute takings of
property.'83 Even here, there are some exceptions. For example, outside of
criminal proceedings, the exercise of police powers does not justify the
outright transfer of title without compensation." Similarly, when exercising
legitimate police powers, states bear responsibility for the adoption of
clearly excessive measures that bear no reasonable relationship to the
regulatory objective. '8
While recognizing that the "general body of precedent usually does not
treat regulatory action as amounting to expropriation," the tribunal in S.D.
Myers, Inc. v. Canada rejected Canada's absolute formulation of the rule.'86
Instead, the tribunal distinguished between expropriation and regulation on
the grounds that the former involves a deprivation of ownership rights, while
the latter constitutes a lesser interference.' 7 The Pope & Talbot tribunal
likewise held that the distinction between takings and bona fide regulations
may depend on the degree of interference.' 8 Therefore, Canada's absolute
formulation went "too far" and would create a "gaping loophole in
international protections against expropriation.""' While agreeing that
regulations can be applied in ways that constitute "creeping expropriation,"
182. Christie, supra note 172, at 337 (recognizing that "no one can ordinarily claim exemption
from even substantial regulation in the public interest"). See also Sacerdoti, supra note 169, at 384
("Deprivation of property should be distinguished from regulation, especially in relation to the use of
property.")
183. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712
cmt. g (1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 196(b) & cmt. d, 197(1)(a)-(b) (1965); 8 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 980 (1967) (quoting Louis Sohn & Richard Baxter, 1961 Harvard Draft Convention on
International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, art. 10(5), 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 554, 562
(1961)); BROWNLIE, supra note 162, at 538; Aldrich, supra note 169, at 605; Christie, supra note
172, at 331-32, 338; John H. Herz, Expropriation of Foreign Property, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 243, 251-
52(1941).
184. See Sedco, Inc. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 248, 275 (1985).
185. Id. at 275 n. 10 (suggesting that the exercise of police power may constitute a taking if it has
"damaged the property to a[n] ... excessive degree"); Bischoff Case (Ger. v. Venez.), 10 R.I.A.A.
420, 420 (1903) (finding the initial taking of a carriage justified as an exercise of the police power,
but imposing liability because of the unreasonable period of detention); WHITEMAN, supra note 183,
at 1010 ("Even where the original taking of property is lawful, its unreasonable detention has been
held to warrant an award."). See also Christie, supra note 172, at 338 (requiring a "plausible
relationship" between the objectives served by the police power and the action taken); Sohn &
Baxter, supra note 183, at 553 (indicating that a state would be liable for destroying a bridge as a
hazard to navigation if the bridge spanned a non-navigable river).
186. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award, at para. 281 (Nov. 13, 2000)
(NAFTA/UNCITRAL) (emphasis added), available at http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b2myers.htm.
187. See id. at para. 282.
188. Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Interim Award, at para. 99 & n.73 (June 26, 2000)
(NAFTA/UNCITRAL), available at http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b3P&T.htm.
189. Id. at para. 99.
[Vol. 29: 43, 20011 Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
however, the tribunal also recognized that not all regulations are susceptible
to challenge; in particular, the tribunal mentioned that the analysis of police
powers would require "special care."'
These rulings should diminish the opposition to Chapter 11. They do
not support the principle of absolute regulatory sovereignty for NAFTA
Parties, but absolute regulatory sovereignty does not exist under customary
international law and it would be surprising to find that principle established
by an investment treaty. Nevertheless, the emerging trend suggests that
investors will face great difficulty in establishing claims for "regulatory
takings" and even greater obstacles to the assertion of expropriation claims
directed at the exercise of police powers.
2. Performance Requirements
Article 1106 prohibits NAFTA Parties from establishing certain
performance requirements. ' Article 1106(l)(a) states that no Party shall, in
connection with the conduct or operation of an investment, impose a
requirement to export at a given level.' Likewise, Articles 1106(1) and
1106(3) provide that no Party shall impose the following requirements either
as conditions for the conduct or operation of an investment, or for the receipt
of an advantage: achievement of a given level or percentage of domestic
content; the purchase,- use, or granting of preferences to locally produced
goods or services; and the restriction of local sales in relation to the volume
or value of exports.' 93 Article 1106(5), clarifies that "[p]aragraphs 1 and 3 do
not apply to any requirement other than the requirements set out in those
paragraphs."
Chapter 11 tribunals have considered - and denied - two claims alleging
the application of unlawful performance requirements. In Pope & Talbot,
Inc. v. Canada, the investor claimed that the imposition of export fees
constituted a performance requirement because the fees reduced the level of
its exports.9 The investor also argued that the export fees forced it to
restrict sales of goods in Canada by relating them to the volume of exports.
195
The tribunal rejected both arguments. Although the tribunal recognized that
190. Id.
191. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1106(1), 32 I.L.M. at 640.
192. Id.
193. Id. arts. 1106(1)(b), (c), (e), 1106(3)(a), (b), (d), 32 I.L.M. at 640.
194. Pope & Talbot, Interim Award, at paras. 47, 59 (June 26, 2000).
195. Id. at para. 49.
the fees deterred exports,"' they did not require any particular level of
exports'97 or place any limitations on domestic sales."'
In S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, the investor claimed that a ban on the
export of PCBs required it to undertake the destruction and disposal of PCBs
in Canada.'99 According to the investor, the export ban constituted an
unlawful performance requirement because it forced the investor to achieve
a given level of domestic content and to purchase or use local goods and
services."' One arbitrator would have upheld the claim because the
destruction operations had to occur in Canada, thus establishing a required
level of "Canadian content." '  The majority disagreed and held that the
export prohibition "clearly" did not require the investor to achieve a given
level of domestic content." Although the majority did not explain the basis
for that conclusion, it seems correct. While destruction operations might
have to take place in Canada, the export ban did not prevent the investor
from using U.S. labor, technology, equipment, and supplies in those
operations. Under these circumstances, the measure did not require the
investor to achieve any particular level of Canadian content.
Thus, Chapter 11 tribunals have not defined unlawful performance
requirements to include measures that merely encourage the reduction of
exports or the consumption of local goods and services. Tribunals have,
instead, conditioned liability on the presence of actual requirements that fall
within the specific prohibitions of Article 1106. In other words, tribunals
have adhered rigorously to the letter of Article 1106 and have preserved the
broad powers of states to create regulatory incentives without triggering
liability.
3. National Treatment
Article 1102 requires each NAFTA Party to accord the others' investors
and their investments "treatment no less favorable than it accords, in like
circumstances, to its own investors" and their investments "with respect to
the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation,
and sale or other disposition of investments."2 3 Thus far, one tribunal has
ruled on a national treatment claim. Although the tribunal determined that
Canada violated its obligations, the tribunal preserved a wide discretion for
196. Id. at para. 75.
197. Id.
198. Id. at para. 80.
199. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award (Nov. 13, 2000) (NAFrA/UNCITRAL), available
at http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b2myers.htm.
200. Id. at para. 270.
201. ld. at paras. 277 (award), 193 (separate opinion of Bryan Schwartz).
202. Id. at para. 276 (award).
203. NAFrA, supra note 1, at art. 1102(1), (2), 32 I.L.M. at 639.
[Vol. 29: 43, 2001] Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
states to adopt necessary environmental regulations that disproportionately
affect foreign investors and investments.
S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada involved the claim of a U.S. company
(SDMI) that specialized in the destruction and disposal of PCBs and hoped
to enter the Canadian market.2" Located in close proximity to Canada's
industrial centers, SDMI had a clear cost advantage over Canadian
competitors located in Alberta."' To facilitate its business plans, SDMI
lobbied the U.S. government for an administrative exemption from a U.S.
ban on the importation of PCBs."°  After U.S. authorities granted this
request, SDMI's Canadian competitors asked Canada's Minister for the
Environment to close the border from the other side. 7 Thereafter, the
Minister adopted a policy favoring PCB disposal "in Canada by
Canadians."""0 To implement that policy, the Minister banned the export of
PCBs based on a "significant danger to the environment and to human life
and health."2  Lower-level Canadian officials consistently opposed the
Minister's decision because the export of PCBs presented no significant
danger to the environment or to human life or health." ' To the contrary,
open borders represented a positive development, 11 since lower costs
encouraged destruction of PCBs and the shorter transportation distances
reduced the likelihood of accidents."' In fact, these considerations prompted
the Canadian government to reopen the border some sixteen months later."3
When SDMI challenged the measure as a denial of national treatment,
Canada responded that the export ban applied equally to Canadians and
foreign investors."4 The tribunal rejected Canada's "one dimensional"
argument and explained that Article 1102 prohibits more than explicit
distinctions between domestic and foreign investors. 2"' Article 1102 also
requires consideration of the intent behind, and practical effect of, the
challenged measures.1 6 With respect to intent, the tribunal held that "the
204. S.D. Myers, Partial Award, at para. 110 (Nov. 13, 2000).
205. Id. at para. 112.
206. Id. atpara. 113.
207. Id. at paras. 122, 168.
208. Id. at paras. 116, 169, 171, 185.
209. Id. at para. 184.
210. Id. at paras. 176, 179.
211. Id. at paras. 162, 164, 166, 167, 173.
212. Id. at paras. 177, 179.
213. Id. at para. 127.
214. Id. at para. 241.
215. Id. at paras. 242, 252-54.
216. Id. at paras. 252-54.
documentary record as a whole clearly indicate[d] that the [measures] were
intended primarily to protect the Canadian PCB disposal industry from U.S.
competition."2 7 In addition, the tribunal concluded that the "practical effect
of the [ban] was that SDMI... [was] prevented from carrying out the
business [it] planned to undertake, which was a clear disadvantage in
comparison to its Canadian competitors."28
Even though the investor established that the Canadian measures
discriminated in favor of Canadian nationals, disparate treatment would not
violate Article 1102 absent a showing that SDMI and its Canadian
competitors were in "like circumstances."2 '9 Thus, interpretation of that
phrase became a dispositive issue. In examining the meaning of "like
circumstances," the tribunal recognized its obligation to consider the
"overall legal context" of Article 1102.220 According to the tribunal, that
context includes "the various provisions of NAFTA, its companion
agreement the [North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(NAAEC)], and principles that are affirmed by the NAAEC."22' This context
establishes that NAFTA Parties have the right to establish high levels of
environmental protection and an obligation to avoid the creation of trade
distortions.2
In defining the phrase "like circumstances," the tribunal also considered
OECD practice with respect to the phrase "in like situations.,,23 This led the
tribunal to observe that comparisons are only valid between enterprises
operating in the same sector.2 " The tribunal also construed OECD practice
to justify the use of policy objectives to define the permissible circumstances
for comparing treatment of domestic and foreign-controlled enterprises. 5
Thus, the "assessment of 'like circumstances' must.., take into account
circumstances that would justify governmental regulations that treat them
differently in order to protect the public interest., 22 Put more simply, SDMI
would not prevail if Canada could demonstrate that a legitimate
environmental concern required the differential and adverse treatment of
SDMI 7
217. Id. at para. 194 (emphasis added).
218. Id. at para. 193.
219. Id. at para. 243.
220. Id. at para. 245.
221. Id. at para. 247.
222. Id.
223. Id. at para. 248.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at para. 250.
227. Id. at para. 173 (separate opinion of Bryan Schwartz).
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Applying these principles, the tribunal concluded that SDMI and its
Canadian competitors operated in the same economic sector."8 In fact,
Canada imposed the export ban to prevent SDMI from competing with
Canadian-owned businesses. 9 The tribunal also found that Canada had "no
legitimate environmental reason for introducing the ban.""23 The tribunal
recognized that Canada had an indirect environmental objective of ensuring
the existence of a domestic PCB remediation industry. 3' Although the
tribunal described this as a "legitimate goal," it held that Canada could have
achieved it through less trade-distorting means, including subsidies or
government procurement policies. Given these facts, the tribunal
unanimously found a violation of Article 1102.232
While a defeat for Canada, the S.D. Myers award represents a distinct
victory for legitimate environmental regulation by NAFTA Parties. The
tribunal established that the NAAEC and the principles reaffirmed therein
form part of the interpretive context for Chapter 11. This context establishes
that NAFTA Parties have the right to adopt high levels of environmental
protection that do not create unnecessary trade barriers. Second, the tribunal
recognized that legitimate environmental concerns could place domestic and
foreign investors in different circumstances and, thereby, justify disparate
treatment. In other words, Article 1102 does not prohibit regulatory
discrimination when necessary to protect the public interest.
4. Minimum Standard of Treatment
Article 1105(1) creates a minimum standard of treatment, which
requires NAFTA Parties to treat each other's investors in accordance with
"international law," including "fair and equitable treatment." '233 Attempts to
interpret these two phrases have generated considerable debate. Construed
according to its ordinary meaning, the phrase "international law" refers to all
234
sources of international law, including treaty obligations. This view
228. Id. at para. 251 (award).
229. Id.
230. Id. at para. 195.
231. Id.
232. Id. at para. 255.
233. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1105(1), 32 I.L.M. at 640.
234. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S.
No. 993, 3 Bevans 1179 (identifying the sources of international law); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 (1987) (stating that "international law"
includes rules established by "customary law," "international agreement," or "general principles
common to the major legal systems of the world"). See also Clyde C. Pearce & Jack Coe, Jr.,
Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter 11: Some Pragmatic Reflections upon the First Case Filed
suggests -that Article 1105 permits NAFTA investors to file claims against
NAFTA Parties based inter alia on the adoption or maintenance of measures
that (1) relate to investors of other NAFTA Parties (or their investments); (2)
cause loss or damage to those investors (or their investments); and (3)
violate a treaty obligation owed to the investors or their home states.235
Others take the position that the phrase "international law" only refers to• • 236
customary international law. According to certain proponents of this view,
Article 1105(1) only prohibits host states from engaging in egregious,
outrageous or shocking conduct.137 In a recent article, a sitting Chapter 11
arbitrator offers a third understanding of Article 1105, which would require
compliance with customary international law plus the provisions of the
NAFTA to the extent that they provide additional protection.38
Against Mexico, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 311, 314 n.10 (2000) (suggesting that the
phrase "international law" refers to treaty text, customary international law, and general principles of
law); Sacerdoti, supra note 169, at 344 (quoting Article 10 of the Energy Charter Treaty, which
requires treatment in accordance with "international law, including treaty obligations").
235. See Pearce & Coe, supra note 234, at 314 n.10 (arguing that the phrase "international law"
refers inter alia to treaty text). See also Robert Stumberg, Sovereignty by Subtraction: The
Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 491, 502, 562-63 & n.498 (1998)
(describing the use of similar language in the draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment and
suggesting that it could incorporate the obligations of WTO agreements).
Others reach a similar result by using external treaty provisions to inform the requirements of "fair
and equitable treatment." See S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award, at para. 264 (Nov. 13,
2000) (NAFrA/UNCITRAL), available at http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b2myers.htm. See also
THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 472-73 (1995) (stating,
in the context of international investment law, that treaty violations clearly constitute actionable
violations of fairness); Sacerdoti, supra note 169, at 341 n. 143, 344 n. 150 (defining "fair and
equitable treatment" to include "respect for international law").
236. See Mtximo Romero Jimdnez, Considerations of NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 243,
244 (2001); Daniel M. Price, Chapter 11-Private Party vs. Government, Investor-State Dispute
Settlement: Frankenstein or Safety Valve?, 26 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 107, 111 (2000). See also KENNETH J.
VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES 78 (1992) (interpreting similar language in
BITs as "serv[ing] simply to incorporate customary international law by reference").
One should, however, take great care in reading commentary on this issue. Although two
writers indicate that the phrase "international law" incorporates "customary" principles or standards
"of international law [that] exist external to the treaty," they do not say that the phrase incorporates
"principles or standards of customary international law." See K. Scott Gudgeon, United States
Bilateral Investment Treaties: Comments on Their Origin, Purposes, and General Treatment
Standards, 4 INT'L TAX & BUS. LAW. 105, 124 (1986); Sandrino, supra note 22, at 311. The
difference in word order may be highly significant because one of those authors (a former Assistant
Legal Adviser with responsibility for the U.S. BIT program) specifically notes that the "customary
standards of international law" include all of the "usual sources of international law" described in
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Gudgeon, supra, at 124 n.70. As
explained above, Article 38 identifies treaties, customary law, and general principles of law as the
usual sources of international law. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
237. See Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, at paras. 108-09, 118 (Apr.
10, 2000) (NAF'A/UNCITRAL) (recounting Canada's arguments to this effect), available at
<http://www.appletonlaw.com/ 4b3P&T.htm>. See also BROWNLIE, supra note 162, at 527-28
(stating that "the treatment of an alien in order to constitute an international delinquency should
amount to an outrage").
238. David A. Gantz, Reconciling Environmental Protection and Investor Rights Under Chapter
11 of NAFTA, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10646, - (June 2001), available in WESTLAW,
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Attempts to define "fair and equitable treatment" have encountered
similar difficulties. Although the phrase has become a familiar term in
BITs, 39 virtually no case law addressed its meaning before the advent of
Chapter 11 disputes.m Furthermore, the thin commentary on "fair and
equitable treatment" has yet to produce a consistent theme. Some authorities
indicate that the term prohibits discriminatory and arbitrary treatment.2 4'
Other writers suggest that fairness in the context of international investment
law forbids the unconscionable frustration of reasonable expectations, for
example by breaching treaty obligations. 2  Construing the phrase even more
expansively, one highly respected writer (Dr. F.A. Mann) states that unfair
and inequitable treatment may include measures that "are not plainly illegal
in the accepted sense of international law."' 3 Because fair and equitable
treatment would be "distinct... from.., principles of international law,"
'
this view might suggest an open-ended mandate to second-guess the
governmental decisions of NAFTA Parties.24
31 ELR 10646
239. See PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 625 (1995);
Mohamed I. Khalil, Treatment of Foreign Investment in Bilateral Investment Treaties, in IBRAHIM
F.I. SHIHATA, LEGAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS 221, 233 (1993); F.A. Mann, British
Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 1981 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 241, 243;
Report to the Development Committee on the Legal Framework for the Treatment of Foreign
Investments, 31 I.L.M. 1368, 1373 (1992); Sacerdoti, supra note 169, at 345; K.P. Sauvant & V.
Aranda, The International Legal Framework for Transnational Corporations, in TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS 83, 96 (A.A. Fatouros ed., 1994); John A. Westberg .& Bertrand P. Marchais,
General Principles Governing Foreign Investment as Articulated in Recent International Tribunal
Awards and Writings of Publicists, in SHIHATA, supra, at 337, 353.
240. See Mann, supra note 239, at 243; Westberg & Marchais, supra note 239, at 353. Two
writers assert that the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal addressed the standard of "fair and
equitable treatment" in Rankin v. Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 135 (1987). See Westberg &
Marchais, supra note 239, at 353-54. The conclusion seems dubious.
241. See Edward A. Laing, Equal Access/Non-Discrimination and Legitimate Discrimination in
International Economic Law, 14 Wis. INT'L L.J. 246, 286 n.201 (1996); A.F.M. Maniruzzaman,
Expropriation of Alien Property and the Principle of Non-Discrimination in International Law of
Foreign Investment, 8 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 57, 76 (1998) (quoting MUCHLINSKI, supra note
239, at 625); Sandrino, supra note 22, at 311.
242. See FRANCK, supra note, 235, at 473. See also Sacerdoti, supra note 169, at 341 n.143
(construing "fair and equitable treatment" to require "respect for international law"). Cf. Brower
Remarks, supra note 22, at 14 (suggesting that the claimant in Methanex Corp. v. United States had
attempted to use "fair and equitable treatment" to incorporate WTO norms).
243. Mann, supra note 239, at 243. See also VANDEVELDE, supra note 236, at 76 (suggesting
that the obligation of "fair and equitable treatment" covers situations "where other substantive
provisions of international and national law provide no protection").
244. Gudgeon, supra note 236, at 125. See also Mann, supra note 239, at 244.
245. In its latest award, the Pope & Talbot tribunal adopted Dr. Mann's definition of "fair and
equitable treatment," but declined "to substitute its judgment... for Canada's" and denied almost all
challenges to Canadian export regulations because they represented a "reasonable response to the
circumstances." See Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, at paras. 121, 123,
These debates about the interpretation of "international law" and "fair
and equitable treatment" border on the absurd, albeit for different reasons.
Because "international law" has a clearly established meaning, 6 current
disagreements about the scope of that phrase reflect an attempt to create
ambiguity where none exists. Conversely, the debates about "fair and
equitable treatment" constitute a futile effort to reduce a general concept to a
precise statement of legal obligation.4 7 Proponents of this effort seem
oblivious to the fact that the inclusion of "fair and equitable treatment" in
Article 1105(1) represents the exemplification of an intentionally vague
term, designed to give adjudicators a quasi-legislative authority to articulate
a variety of rules necessary to achieve the treaty's object and purpose in
particular disputes.4
Thus far, three Chapter 11 tribunals have rendered decisions that shed
light on the minimum standard of treatment required by Article 1105.249
125, 128, 155, 185 (Apr. 10, 2000) (NAFTA/UNCITRAL), available at
http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b3P&T.htm. This suggests that Dr. Mann's views do not necessarily
invite open-ended scrutiny of measures adopted or maintained by host states.
246. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
247. Cf David A. Gantz, Potential Conflicts Between Investor Rights and Environmental
Regulation Under NAFTA's Chapter 11, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 651, 746 (2001) ("Perhaps
like Justice Potter Stewart and pornography, it will be easier to identify denials of fair and equitable
treatment than to define them more specifically.").
248. When treaty drafters intentionally use ambiguous phrases to gloss over differences, they
effectively grant the competent judicial body a quasi-legislative power to formulate specific rules of
conduct. See I GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 495 (3d ed. 1957). The phrase
"fair and equitable treatment" evidently falls within this category of treaty provisions. See J.G.
MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETrLEMENT (3d ed. 1998) ("When an arbitrator is asked by
the parties to have regard to equitable considerations ... he ... begins to assume the role of a
legislator, creating law for the case in hand."); UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 41 (1988) ("It is in the nature of a very general
concept like fair and equitable treatment that there can be no precise definition. What is fair and
what is equitable may largely be a matter of interpretation in each individual case."); VANDEVELDE,
supra note 236, at 76 ("The phrase is vague and its precise content will have to be defined over time
through treaty practice, including perhaps arbitration under the disputes provisions."). See also C.
WILFRED JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 426, 767 (1964) (explaining
that "equity ... is ... largely a matter of adapting principles to circumstances," and arguing that
"equitable concepts ... should play an important part in adapting principles to circumstances in a
world in which the law is constantly confronted with new problems and new needs").
249. In July 2001, the Free Trade Commission (i.e., cabinet-level representatives of the NAFTA
Parties) also adopted the first Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, which
purport inter alia to make the following three interpretations Article 1105(1). See Notes of
Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, July 31, 2001, § B, available at http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-Interpr-e.asp. First, the Notes of Interpretation provide that "Article
1105(1) prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment as the minimum
standard of treatment" required by Chapter 11. Id., § B(I) (emphasis added). Second, "[t]he
concept[] of 'fair and equitable treatment' ... do[es] not require treatment in addition to or beyond
that which is required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens."
Id., § B(2). Third, "[a] determination that there has been a breach of another provision of the
NAFTA, or of a separate international agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of
Article 1105(1)." Id., § B(3).
The NAFTA Parties state that the Notes of Interpretation "clarify" the meaning of Article
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Although they have found violations in two cases, the tribunals have
uniformly avoided expansive constructions and have attempted to minimize
the intrusion of international review into substantive governmental
decisions.
In Azinian v. Mexico, the tribunal reviewed Mexican judicial
proceedings to determine if they constituted a denial of justice as defined by
1105(1) and indicate that the Notes of Interpretation bind all sitting and future Chapter 11 tribunals.
See id., Preamble (stating that the Notes of Interpretation "clarify" Article 1105); NAFTA Trade
Ministers Clarify Chapter 11 Investment Provision, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1234 (Aug. 2, 2001)
(indicating that the U.S. Trade Representative expects the Notes of Interpretation to "apply to all
future and pending cases"). The Notes of Interpretation, however, resolve few (if any) debates about
the meaning of Article 1105(1). Without trying to undertake a comprehensive analysis, one should
immediately perceive three facts that will prevent the Notes of Interpretation from settling existing
disagreements. First, it is not clear that the Notes of Interpretation have any binding force. While
Article 1131(2) authorizes cabinet-level representatives to adopt binding "interpretations" of
NAFTA's provisions, Article 2202 governs "amendments" of NAFTA's provisions. According to
Article 2202, the NAFTA Parties may agree on any "modification of or addition to" NAFTA, but
such amendments become "an integral part" of NAFTA only upon approval by the NAFTA Parties
"in accordance with the applicable legal procedures of each Party." In other words, NAFIA draws a
fundamental distinction between interpretation and modification: cabinet-level officials have the
authority to resolve ambiguities, but not the power to modify obligations without submitting the
proposed text for domestic political approval. If, as the author believes, the Free Trade
Commission's purported "interpretation" of Article 1105 actually constitutes a "modification," it
represents an ultra vires, attempted amendment that has no binding force.
Even if the Notes of Interpretation have some binding force, one must seriously doubt the U.S.
contention that they are binding on Chapter 11 tribunals in pending disputes. Although Article
1131(2) of NAFTA does not specifically prohibit retroactive application of interpretive statements,
Article 1131(1) requires Chapter 11 tribunals to "decide the issues in dispute in accordance with...
applicable rules of international law." Because those rules include the principle that "no one may be
the judge of his own cause," it seems highly unlikely that a Chapter 11 tribunal would construe
Article 1131(1) as authorizing the use of interpretive statements by NAFTA Parties to resolve the
outcome of pending disputes in which they have demonstrable interests. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 cmt. 1 (1987) (identifying the rule
that no one may be judge in his own cause as a general principle that has achieved the status of
international law).
Assuming that the Notes of Interpretation constitute a binding interpretation of Article 1105(1),
NAFTA investors may still argue that Article 1103 entitles them to a level of "fair and equitable
treatment" that exceeds the requirements of customary international law. Article 1103 requires the
NAFI'A Parties to give NAFTA investors and their investments treatment no less favorable than
given to investors and investments of countries that have concluded BITs with NAFTA Parties.
NAF1'A, supra note 1, at art. 1103, 32 I.L.M. at 639. The "fair and equitable treatment" provisions
of BITs, in turn, have been construed to exceed the requirements of customary international law. See
Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, at paras. 110-13 (Apr. 10, 2000). Thus,
whatever the meaning of Article 1105(1), NAFTA investors may use Article 1103 to bring claims
based on the more generous standards of BITs, and Chapter 11 tribunals may interpret the BITs
without regard to the Free Trade Commission's Notes of Interpretation. See id. at para. 117
(concluding that a limited interpretation of Article 1105 would not prevent claims for the denial of
"fair and equitable treatment" under the broader interpretations of BITs). See also NAFTA, supra
note 1, art. 1131(2), 32 I.L.M. at 645 (only authorizing the Free Trade Commission to make binding
interpretations "of this Agreement").
customary international law. As noted above, the investor never asserted a
claim under this heading and the tribunal raised the issue out of an
abundance of caution." °  Although this part of the award probably
constitutes dicta, it provides strong evidence of how other Chapter 11
tribunals would approach claims that a NAFTA Party has violated the
minimum standard. Consistent with prevailing views on international
adjudication, the Azinian tribunal first recognized that it did not serve an
appellate function and had no warrant to set aside domestic court judgments
for a lack of persuasive force."5 ' To challenge domestic court proceedings in
the particular case, the investors would have to establish a denial of justice,2"
which might include a refusal to hear their claim, creation of "undue delay,"
grossly deficient administration of justice, or clearly malicious or arbitrary
applications of municipal law.25' The tribunal, however, found no
deficiencies in the Mexican proceedings.25 ' The tribunal also found that the
evidentiary record was not so insubstantial as to render the Mexican
judgment an arbitrary decision.255 Thus, the tribunal found no denial of
justice and, correspondingly, no violation of Article 1105.
As noted above, the investor in Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico planned to
construct and operate a hazardous waste facility. To this end, it obtained all
necessary environmental approvals from the competent federal authorities,
who assured the investor that it required no additional approvals. 6 When
local authorities in Guadalcazar unexpectedly instructed Metalclad to apply
for a construction permit, federal authorities advised it to do so as a
courtesy."7 The federal authorities also stated that local authorities lacked
any basis to deny the permit. 8 After receiving Metalclad's application,
however, the local authorities denied the construction permit without giving
Metalclad notice or an opportunity to be heard.59 In addition, the local
authorities cited no defects in the facility's construction.2" Metalclad
submitted that these actions constituted unfair and inequitable treatment.
Consistent with the views expressed above, 6' the Metalclad tribunal did not
try to formulate a precise definition of fair and equitable treatment. At the
250. * Azinian v. Mexico, Arbitral Award, at paras. 100-01 (Nov. 1, 1999) (NAFTA/ICSID Add'l
Facility), available at http://www.worldbank.orglicsid/cases/robert-awards.pdf.
251. Id. at paras. 84, 99.
252. Id. at para. 99.
253. Id. at paras. 102-03.
254. Id. at para. 102.
255. Id. at paras. 105, 120.
256. See Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Arbitral Award, at paras. 52, 78, 80, 85-90 (Aug. 30, 2000)
(NAFTA/ICSID Add'l Facility), available at http://www.pearcelaw.com/metalclad.html.
257. See id. at paras. 40-41.
258. Id. at para. 88.
259. Id. at para. 91.
260. Id. at para. 93.
261. See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
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outset of its decision, however, the tribunal held that Metalclad's investment
did not receive "fair and equitable treatment in accordance with
international law."'262 By linking "fair and .equitable treatment" to the
requirements of "international law," the tribunal avoided the open-ended and
subjective interpretation advocated by Dr. Mann and, instead, prescribed an
assessment of fairness and equity in light of specific rules of intemational
law.
The tribunal thus turned its attention to the principles established by
NAFTA. Prominent among these, the tribunal found several references to
transparency." 3 The tribunal noted that the NAFTA Parties agreed to
"ensure a predictable commercial framework for business planning and
investment" and to "ensure that [their] laws, regulations, procedures, and
administrative rulings ... are promptly.., made available in such a manner
as to enable interested persons.., to become acquainted with them."2"
From these principles, the tribunal concluded that NAFTA Parties have the
obligation to make sure that all legal requirements affecting investment are
capable of being readily known.2 65 According to the tribunal, "[t]here should
be no room for doubt or uncertainty on such matters."2 Once a NAFTA
Party "become[s] aware of any scope for misunderstanding or confusion," it
must "ensure that the correct position is promptly determined and clearly
stated. '2 67
Mexico failed to meet this standard because it did not establish a clear
rule on the need or procedures for obtaining local. construction permits.2 68 In
addition, the failure of local authorities to give the investor notice of a town
meeting that resulted in the denial of its request for a construction permit, to
provide an opportunity to be heard, or to identify any relevant considerations
for the denying the permit demonstrated the lack of a transparent or
predictable framework for business planning and investment. 69
Observers have variously described the Metalclad award as a
"monumental development" for claimants 76 and an excessive limitation on
262. Metalclad, Arbitral Award, at para. 74 (Aug. 30, 2000) (emphasis added).
263. See id. at para. 76.
264. Id. at para. 71 (quoting NAFTA, Preamble and art. 1802(1), 32 I.L.M. at 605, 648).
265. See id. at para. 76.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at para. 88.
269. See id. at paras. 91-93, 99.
270. See NAFTA: U.S. Waste Control Firm Refiles Case Under NAFTA Investor-State Provisions,
supra note 150, at 1528.
the regulatory authority of NAFTA Parties."' One wonders, however, if
either assessment withstands rigorous scrutiny. To begin with, it should
come as no surprise that an acute lack of transparency would constitute
unfair and inequitable treatment in the context of an investment treaty. The
most qualified writers support this conclusion."2 In a related context, WTO
precedent establishes that the lack of transparency may constitute "arbitrary
discrimination" against international trade."3  Nor is it particularly
astonishing that the tribunal would have found an acute lack of transparency
on the facts of Metalclad. Again, WTO precedent establishes that regulatory
systems lack transparency if they deny individual applications without
notice, an opportunity to be heard, or the provision of reasoned, written
decisions.27
Perhaps the assessments of Metalclad rest on the tribunal's statement
that NAFTA Parties "should" leave "no room for doubt or uncertainty" with
respect to investment regulations. 5 The tribunal, however, did not hold that
the NAFTA Parties "must" leave "no room for doubt and uncertainty. 276
Rather, it decided that NAFTA Parties may face liability if they first become
aware of uncertainties and then fail to correct them with reasonable
dispatch.27  This obligation does not seem particularly onerous.
Furthermore, the award does nothing to interfere with the substantive
regulatory policies of NAFTA Parties; it only requires them to describe and
apply their policies in clear and predictable ways.
Observers may believe that the definition of "fair and equitable
treatment" by reference to external treaty obligations will expose NAFTA
Parties to a variety of new claims. The Metalclad award does not, however,
271. See, e.g., Stephen L. Kass & Jean M. McCarroll, The "Metalclad" Decision Under NAFTA's
Chapter 11, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 27, 2000, at 3 (observing that the Metalclad award "has shocked those
environmentalists and governmental officials... who have been working to... prevent the 'race to
the bottom' predicted by [those] who view free trade as a ... way to circumvent.., environmental
standards").
272. See, e.g., Daniel M. Price, Some Observations on Chapter Eleven of NAFTA, 23 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 421, 423-24 (2001) (concluding that "fair and equitable treatment" requires
host states to deal "transparently in their relations with foreigners"); Sacerdoti, supra note 169, at
344 n. 150 (explaining that "fair and equitable treatment" under the Lomd Convention requires "all
rules and practices affecting an investor's interest [to] be transparent[] [and] predictable."). Mr.
Price served as the principal U.S. negotiator of Chapter 11, and Sacerdoti serves as a judge on the
WTO Appellate Body.
273. United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 'T/DS58/AB/R,
at paras. 180-84 (Oct. 12, 1998), available in 1998 WL 720123 (W.T.O), at *54-*55. See also
Gantz, supra note 247, at 746-47 (identifying "arbitrary" and "discriminatory" treatment as
functional equivalents of "unfair and inequitable" treatment).
274. See United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/AB/R, at para. 180.
275. See Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Arbitral Award, at para. 76 (Aug. 30, 2000) (NAFTA/ICSID
Add'l Facility) (emphasis added), available at http://www.pearcelaw.com/metalclad.html.
275. See id.
277. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
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define "fair and equitable treatment" in a surprising or expansive way. To
begin with, the most highly qualified writers have concluded that the
violation of treaty obligations "clearly" constitutes unfair treatment in the
context of international investment."' Furthermore, by anchoring "fair and
equitable treatment" in specific rules of international law, the award limits
the potential for subjective analysis by individual tribunals.
In addressing the minimum standard of treatment, the S.D. Myers
tribunal took a similar - but more explicitly deferential - approach. The
tribunal recognized that it had no "open-ended mandate to second-guess" the
controversial policy choices of NAFTA Parties. 79 To preserve the decision-
making powers of NAFTA Parties, the tribunal construed the phrase "fair
and equitable treatment" in conjunction with the words "in accordance with
international law."2"0 Interpreted this way, Article 1105 only prohibits unjust
or arbitrary treatment that is "unacceptable from the international
perspective. '28 Claimants can usually establish such treatment by
demonstrating the breach of a rule of international law specifically designed
to protect investors." The tribunal cautioned, however, that not every
violation of international law constitutes unfair and inequitable treatment."
Furthermore, in making determinations, tribunals must consider the "high
measure of deference that international law generally extends to...
domestic authorities to regulate matters within their ... borders.""M
Notwithstanding this explicitly deferential framework, a majority of the
tribunal held that Canada's violation of Article 1102 (national treatment)
established a denial of fair and equitable treatment.8 In a separate opinion,
one member of the tribunal indicated that Canada had also acted unfairly and
inequitably by failing to give SDMI notice of the proposal to ban exports of
278. FRANCK, supra note 235, at 473. See also Sacerdoti, supra note 169, at 341 n.143
(construing "fair and equitable treatment" to require "respect for international law").
279. See S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award, at para. 261 (Nov. 13, 2000)
(NAFTAIUNCITRAL), available at http://www.appletonlaw.comI4b2myers.htm.
280. See id. at para. 262.
281. Id. at para. 263.
282. See id. at para. 264.
283. See id.
284. Id. at para. 263. Put more simply, it appears that the tribunal would generally consider a
violation of international investment law to constitute a sufficient (but not necessary) showing of
unfair and inequitable treatment. This leaves open the possibility that state conduct might be
"unacceptable from the international perspective" without violating international law. For example,
a technically proper, but abusive, exercise of treaty rights might constitute unfair and inequitable
treatment. See Price, supra note 272, at 423-24 (indicating that "fair and equitable" treatment
requires adherence to the principle of good faith).
285. See S.D. Myers, Partial Award, at para. 266 (Nov. 13, 2000).
PCBs, granting its Canadian competitors privileged access to decision-
makers, and not responding to SDMI's communications regarding the ban.86
According to the separate opinion, these actions probably violated principles
of procedural fairness and transparency established by Article 1802 of
NAFTA and other widely accepted treaties, including the WTO agreements
and BITs."7 The separate opinion declined to find Canada in violation of the
particular treaty provisions, however, because the pleadings did not
specifically address those provisions and Canada, therefore, lacked a
meaningful opportunity to respond to the analysis. 8
In addressing the minimum standard of treatment, Chapter 11 tribunals
have uniformly shown deference to domestic institutions. They have
recognized that Article 1105 creates very limited opportunities to review the
actions of NAFTA Parties. Accordingly, they have adopted constructions
that avoid open-ended, subjective, and unpredictable analysis. These
decisions should reassure the public that Article 1105 does not threaten the
regulatory sovereignty of NAFTA Parties. It chiefly requires NAFTA
Parties to observe in good faith specific rules of international law to which
they have voluntarily consented.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article does not aim to denigrate the opponents of Chapter 11; the
author recognizes their genuine concern for the public interest. The article
suggests, however, that popular anxiety rests on the untested premise that
Chapter 11 lacks balance and favors foreign corporate interests over the
public interest. To challenge that premise, the article has examined a
number of recent decisions and awards rendered by Chapter 11 tribunals.
The emerging case law suggests that tribunals have adopted a balanced
interpretive strategy, which promotes access to arbitration but does not
impose unrealistic standards of conduct on NAFTA Parties. When applying
procedural and jurisdictional provisions, tribunals have preferred flexible
constructions that promote access to arbitration and a hearing on the merits -
even when the isolated text might support a different result. Despite this
commitment to access, tribunals have carefully preserved - and in one case
exercised - the authority to dismiss abusive claims.
This trend might confirm fears that NAFTA Parties will rarely succeed
in eliminating extravagant claims at an early stage of arbitration. When
considering claims on their merits, however, tribunals have adhered
rigorously to the text of Chapter 11 and specific rules of international law.
In so doing, tribunals have deferred to municipal decision-makers and
286. See id. at paras. 241, 246-47, 252 (separate opinion of Bryan Schwartz).
287. See id. at paras. 249-50, 253-55, 257.
288. See id. at paras. 253, 258.
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reaffirmed their authority to regulate in the public interest. Furthermore,
tribunals have recognized their limited powers of review and have adopted
constructions that avoid open-ended and subjective examination of
governmental actions. While it may be premature to draw definitive
conclusions, Chapter 11 tribunals show every sign of maintaining an
appropriate balance between the rights. of NAFTA investors to air their
complaints and the obligations of NAFTA Parties to regulate in the public
interest.
That said, a balanced approach still requires tribunals to find violations
and award damages in meritorious cases. Canada and Mexico have already
experienced that indignity, and the United States seems unlikely to emerge
from Chapter 11 proceedings unscathed. When our government loses a
substantial claim, the public will become understandably distressed. Let us
hope that we will have the fortitude to acknowledge the deficiencies of our
institutions, instead of vilifying Chapter 11 as an "outrageous""2 9 or
"bizarre"2 regime.
289. See Ferguson, supra note 5, at 519 (quoting the Executive Director of the Council of
Canadians for the proposition that "NAFTA gives outrageous powers to corporations").
290. See Alvarez, supra note 55, at 307 (referring to Chapter 11 as "the most bizarre human rights
treaty ever conceived").

